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Executive Summary 
Almost fifteen years after transitioning to civilian-electoral rule, Nigeria is still wrestling with 
the legacy of a protracted period of military government and the ‘resource curse’ associated 
with its huge oil wealth. The country’s oil-centred political economy and political settlement 
geared at furthering the interests of dominant domestic and international elites have not 
changed much since 1999. Those elites include senior government and civil service officials, 
political (party) leaders and ‘godfathers’, influential businessmen, retired military officers, 
Nigerian and international oil industry bosses, and community chiefs. All of them have vested 
interests in maintaining or expanding their stakes in Nigeria’s ‘oil poker’. There are some 
contending, pro-reform elites in the democratic political opposition to the hegemonic Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP), pockets of the state at the federal and regional levels, and civil 
society and the media. But they have been a relatively weak minority since the transition to 
civilian-electoral rule.   
Violence in the oil-rich Niger Delta, in which several thousand people have lost their lives in 
the past twenty years, spiked in the mid-2000s. Displacing non-violent organisations and 
social movements struggling for ‘resource control’ and a halt to large-scale environmental 
destruction, new armed militant groups emerged and started targeting the oil industry. The 
federal government responded first with military intervention, but in 2009 was compelled to 
declare an amnesty: over 20,000 militants were disarmed and demobilised. Yet the Delta 
remains volatile as militant leaders were co-opted while the roots of the conflict had not been 
addressed; Nigeria´s political settlement was expanded without becoming more inclusive or 
democratic.  
The post-1999 settlement emerged from a military controlled transition to civilian-electoral 
rule that was geared towards protecting the economic, political and judicial interests of the 
outgoing federal military rulers and their civilian allies, who had led Nigeria into a quagmire of 
corruption, public mismanagement, poverty and violence. The pact also included the major 
oil companies (‘oil majors’). Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, they had reaped great 
benefits from a close alliance with a succession of military governments and had high stakes 
in maintaining their lucrative business operations in the country after the generals’ formal 
departure from power. 
What in the pre-1999 era had been an openly illegitimate, predatory and exclusionary 
political settlement centred on the appropriation of massive oil rents by relatively few federal 
(military) elites and the oil majors, began to morph into a seemingly broader one under the 
new political regime. While competition for elected office at the federal, regional and local 
levels of government increased, this happened mostly within the ruling, patronage-based 
PDP and not between several genuinely representative and issue based political parties. 
Furthermore, with the exception of the 2011 polls, all elections since 1999 were surrounded 
by violence and rigged, especially those of 2003 and 2007. The political opposition has been 
weak, though more recently it has made some electoral inroads, especially in Nigeria’s south 
west. With the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) still languishing in the National Assembly, the 
governance of Nigeria’s vital oil industry and the distribution of oil rents remain essentially 
unchanged since the days of military rule. The exception is a constitutionally mandated 
increase to 13 per cent of the transfer of oil revenues from the Federal Account to the oil 
bearing Niger Delta states.   
In the wake of the transition, and with their corporate brand image in shatters, the oil majors 
adopted a lower key public stance and evolved their corporate social responsibility activities 
in the Niger Delta states from community assistance to community development. Due to their 
unrivalled economic and technological clout they remain key players in Nigeria’s oil-centred 
post-1999 settlement. At the same time, social mobilisation for resource control and 
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environmental protection in the Delta was progressively sidelined and overtaken by a 
plethora of armed militant and criminal groups. These groups have variably served as paid 
thugs for politicians, mostly of the PDP, eager to win seats in the National Assembly and the 
Niger Delta governorships; private protection forces for the transnational oil companies 
(TOCs); brokers between the oil majors and local community leaders; as well as oil thieves 
and kidnappers, often working hand-in-glove with members of the federal security forces and 
political elites. 
A number of the commanders of militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND) were able to amass large fortunes in the past years and have 
effectively been co-opted into Nigeria’s post-1999 settlement. The 2009 presidential amnesty 
played an important role in this respect, as have the (covert) bargains between former 
militants and the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2011; 2011 to 
present) and the multi-million dollar contracts they have been given by the federal 
government for the protection of the oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta. 
This dynamic and fluid, yet essentially conservative and predatory political settlement has 
significantly contributed to first, spurring violence and large-scale criminal activity in the Delta 
and, since 2009, pacifying the region through the co-option of militant leaders. No 
foundations were laid for a lasting peace or addressing the grievances of the region´s 
communities and involving them in any meaningful way in the process. This has not 
precluded attempts by the federal government and the oil majors to tackle the Delta’s severe 
development problems. Yet overall, these efforts have not borne fruit due to a lack of 
incentives for, and political will on the part of, federal and regional elites to follow through 
with programmes and improving governance. Throughout, it has been easier for them to pay 
militants off and default back to repressive security policies. Regardless of the serious 
human rights violations associated with brutal and ineffective military interventions in the 
Delta, the political cost involved in deploying the armed forces has been smaller than it would 
have been had the PDP governments in power since 1999 seriously pursued reforming 
Nigeria’s system of appropriating and distributing oil revenues. In turn, the oil majors have 
greatly benefited from the alliance with the federal government, and they continue to do so. 
Beyond their enhanced community development initiatives they have not shown much 
interest in supporting deeper reforms. 
The big challenges and problems remain. The ‘Niger Delta question’, as it is often referred to 
in Nigeria, is not close to resolution. The region has temporarily been pacified and oil 
production has gone up again, though it still falls short of Nigeria’s full production potential. 
But the reintegration of former mid-ranking militant commanders and fighters is faltering and 
social unrest persists due to high youth unemployment and poverty. Large scale organised 
criminal activity continues. Violence could quickly re-erupt and send the Delta back to where 
it was before 2009 if no remedying action is taken by the Nigerian authorities and their 
international partners. We suggest focusing policy on the following macro areas: 
 Strengthening accountability and mechanisms of redress at the local through to the 
federal levels of government and governance. 
 
 Building the capacity of Niger Delta civil society, community and social organisations 
and movements to participate in decision making processes related to local and 
regional development and oil production. 
 
 Linking the reintegration of demobilised militants into economic and social life to local 
development efforts in the Niger Delta, with a particular focus on job creation and 
vocational training for youth. 
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 Democratising Nigeria’s political parties, especially the PDP, to move away from 
patronage-based and godfather politics; and strengthening the electoral process. 
 
 Strengthening Nigeria’s justice system to reduce judicial impunity, corruption, human 
rights violations by state security forces and (state-sponsored) criminality, such as 
massive oil theft and illegal oil lifting. 
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1 Introduction 
Nigeria´s experience in the past half century of authoritarian military rule, public 
mismanagement and corruption, social mobilisation, violence, and the spread of organised 
crime is intimately associated with oil. As Africa’s largest oil producer, the country has been 
wrestling hard with the ‘paradox of plenty’ and the ‘resource curse’. Since independence from 
Britain in 1960, much of Nigeria’s enormous wealth has been squandered and stolen by 
corrupt and self-seeking national elites. They have worked in a close alliance with 
transnational oil companies (TOCs), which have provided the technical know-how and 
financial muscle to produce Nigeria´s coveted high-quality crude.  
In 1999, the country witnessed a transition from military to civilian-electoral rule. Hopes were 
high – especially in the nine oil-bearing states of the Niger Delta – that the crucial issue of 
access to, and distribution of, oil revenues would finally be addressed and resolved. Yet 
these hopes were dashed. By the mid-2000s the federal state had militarised the Delta in a 
brutal bid to uproot an increasingly powerful ‘petro-insurgency’ which had taken the place of 
local groups struggling peacefully for ‘resource control’ and an end to the destruction of the 
region’s natural environment due to oil production operations. A 2009 presidential amnesty 
for armed militants resulted in a temporary drop in violence, which had killed several 
thousand people since the early 1990s, and attacks on the oil infrastructure in the Delta. But 
the region remains on the brink as the socioeconomic and political grievances that have 
driven social protest and armed insurgency have not been addressed, and new challenges, 
including large-scale organised criminal activities, have taken root. 
This report analyses the nature and evolution of violence in the Niger Delta since the late 
1990s, and the responses to it by the Nigerian state and international players, by using the 
‘political settlement’ approach. This is based on the observation that elites, both Nigerian and 
international, have significant responsibility for, and are important actors in, the violence and 
large scale organised criminal activities in the Niger Delta. Analyses of the emergence of 
social protest and, later on, armed militancy in the Niger Delta have tended to focus on need 
(grievances due to political repression and economic deprivation), creed (feelings of selective 
discrimination and marginalisation based on beliefs and identity), and greed (personal or 
group pursuit of economic gain). Combined, these approaches capture important elements of 
the picture but fall short of contributing to an understanding of the broader political-
institutional and political economy factors that have underpinned and driven violence in the 
Niger Delta since the 1990s. 
A focus on the nature and evolution of Nigeria’s political settlement in the wake of the 
transition to civilian-electoral rule helps to shed light on the fundamental question of why 
violence involving a growing number of state and non-state actors escalated and receded at 
certain points after the political transition; and what would be the elements of a more 
effective strategy for addressing the causes and manifestations of violence or preventing its 
re-emergence. Political settlements can usefully be defined as formal and informal one-off 
events, such as political elite pacts, peace agreements and amnesties. But they also take the 
form of more dynamic and fluid processes of (overt and covert) negotiation, compromise, 
bargaining, accommodation and coalition and network-building between powerful individuals 
and groups.  
Nigeria’s dominant elites include senior government and civil service officials, political (party) 
leaders and ‘godfathers’, influential businessmen, retired military officers, Nigerian and 
international oil industry bosses, and community chiefs. All of them have vested interests in 
maintaining or expanding their stakes in Nigeria’s ‘oil poker’. There are some contending, 
pro-reform elites in the democratic political opposition to the hegemonic PDP, pockets of the 
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state at the federal and regional levels, and civil society and the media. But they have been a 
relatively weak minority since the transition to civilian-electoral rule. 
Going beyond the conventional view that political settlements can be violence-prone and 
development-stopping because they are not inclusive or not inclusive enough, this report 
argues that inclusivity on its own is a weak indicator. Rather, it is important to ask how a 
political settlement is expanded to include additional social groups; who is included and why; 
and what the expansion of the settlement means for reducing the risk of violence through 
improved governance and public policies. In the Niger Delta this means policies capable of 
addressing socioeconomic grievances and other drivers of violence including criminal 
opportunities associated with large-scale oil theft (locally known as ‘bunkering’), illegal oil 
refining, kidnapping and piracy. 
The report is organised as follows: chapter two provides an analysis of the evolution and 
nature of Nigeria´s post-1999 political settlement; chapter three examines the accounts, 
drivers and trends of violence in the Niger Delta since the 1990s; chapter four focuses on the 
policy responses by the Nigerian state, the oil majors and international donors to the violence 
in the Niger Delta; and chapter five provides an outlook on what Nigerian and international 
actors and stakeholders should do to prevent and mitigate violence in the Niger Delta more 
effectively. While the report recognises that international leverage is limited, it proposes that 
outside stakeholders  – including the UK government  – should make more significant 
contributions to violence prevention and mitigation in the Niger Delta by facilitating political 
and policy dialogue between a broader range of Nigerian elites, and focusing development 
assistance on the fundamental governance reforms identified in this report.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 I wish to thank Ike Okonta, Cassandra Biggs, E. Chizoba Unaeze and Freida M’Cormack, who worked closely with me in the 
elaboration of this report. Many thanks also to Henry Okotie and Thomas Maettig of Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nigeria for 
supporting the organisation and holding of the policy validation workshop at the Stiftung’s offices in Abuja, and the Nigerian and 
international workshop participants for attending the event and making significant contributions. Robin Luckham and Jeremy 
Lind provided insightful comments on earlier draft versions of this report. As always, I am solely responsible for any factual 
mistakes and/or errors of interpretation the reader might encounter. 
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2 Nigeria’s post-1999 political settlement and 
the Niger Delta Question 
Nigeria’s politics since the transition to civilian-electoral rule in 1999 have essentially been 
shaped by the persistence of the long standing struggle over the access to, and distribution 
of, the country’s huge oil wealth. Although the formal rules of the political game changed with 
the end of military or military-dominated government and governance, which had prevailed 
for most of the time since the country achieved independence from Britain in 1960, the actual 
processes and mechanisms through which power is contested and distributed in Nigeria 
have not been altered much since then. Where they have, it has often been through violence 
and the spread of corruption and organised criminal activities rather than democratic politics. 
At the core of power in Nigeria and its (violent) contestation are the relationships between 
key national elites and their international counterparts that play out in a web of interests 
primarily centred on the appropriation of oil rents. These elite relationships have shaped 
Nigeria’s post-1999 political settlement and have had a profound impact on the conflict and 
violence in the Niger Delta, which produces the lion share of the country’s high quality oil.  
This section examines the emergence and evolution of Nigeria’s post-1999 political 
settlement and the implications for the oil-bearing Niger Delta. We use the term ‘elites’ in a 
broad sense. They are understood as groups of powerful people who ‘command a [...] large 
slice of the national income’ and have the capacity to ‘make or shape the main political and 
economic decisions’ (Hossain and Moore 2002:2). We suggest that in post-1999 Nigeria the 
focus ought to be on political power holders and brokers at the federal, state and local levels. 
Further, our conception of ‘elites’ refers to groups of powerful individuals that are associated 
with the state and the oil industry, as well as contending and/or ‘insurgent’ non-state groups 
with significant influence over resources and communities in the Niger Delta. As such, this 
report analyses the role of diverse elite actors in the shaping of Nigeria’s post-1999 political 
settlement, including political (party) leaders, businessmen, retired military officers, oil 
industry managers and local chiefs of a more traditional cut. By the same token, we focus on 
civil society and social movement leaders and commanders of different armed militant 
groups in the Niger Delta, who challenged  – in completely different ways – the conservative 
and predatory yet dynamic and fluid political settlement focused on that emerged in the wake 
of the Nigerian military’s departure from power in 1999. 
Building on the relatively recent and evolving academic literature on political settlements we 
define them as formal and informal one-off events, such as elite pacts, peace agreements 
and amnesties, or a new constitution. But political settlements can also take the form of more 
dynamic and fluid processes of (overt and covert) negotiation, compromise, bargaining, 
accommodation and coalition and network-building between powerful groups of state and 
non-state actors, including influential and resourceful contending groups like militant, 
insurgent and criminal organisations (Laws 2012; Di John and Putzel 2009; Gutierrez 2011; 
Bratton and Masunungure 2011; Parks and Cole 2010).  
In this vein, this chapter analyses, first, what can be called ‘critical junctures’ or significant 
political events in Nigeria since 1999. Here we focus on the initial military dominated elite 
pact that underpinned the country’s transition to civilian-electoral rule which was followed by 
a series of illegitimate and rigged elections, a federal military crackdown in the Niger Delta 
and the 2009 presidential amnesty for Niger Delta militants – all of which contributed to 
cementing the conservative, predatory and oil-centred political settlement Nigeria inherited 
from the former military rulers. Second, we put the spotlight on the constitutional legal basis 
and framework that formally structures the access to, and distribution of, oil rents in Nigeria, 
and which, again, essentially dates back to the dark times when the Nigerian military ruled in 
cohorts with the transnational oil companies. Third, we focus on informal, covert alliances 
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and rolling elite bargains between federal and Niger Delta elites, including militant leaders, in 
the wake of the 2009 amnesty.2 
2.1.1 Critical junctures  
The 1999 elite pact and the transition to civilian-electoral rule 
In the late 1990s, key sectors of Nigeria’s military and civilian elites at the federal level 
reached an agreement that political liberalisation was in their best interest given the 
thoroughly discredited nature of the incumbent military regime. This ‘gentlemen’s 
agreement’3 foresaw maintaining tight control of the country’s oil wealth as well as not 
holding the outgoing military to account for the many abuses of human rights and acts of 
corruption it had committed while in power (Fayemi 1999). The literature on post-1999 
Nigerian politics is unequivocal in highlighting that the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) 
governments of President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999 – 2003, 2003 – 2007) and Umaru Musa 
Yar’Adua/Goodluck Jonathan (2007 – 2011) did not meet the expectations of Nigeria’s pro-
democracy and human rights groups. The transition was based on an ‘elite pact, which 
secured the exit of the military from politics’ but failed to ‘ensure more inclusive and effective 
governance’ (Ibeanu and Luckham 2006). 
Departing but powerful military rulers 
The 1999 elite pact resulted from closed door negotiations between senior military officers 
and conservative sectors of Nigeria’s political elite, particularly from the northern part of the 
country. Having been in power since the end of the First Republic in January 1966, with only 
a brief civilian interregnum in the late 1970s, the Nigerian armed forces and the army in 
particular had emerged as a powerful broker in national political and economic life.4 Several 
retired generals had gone into business – large-scale farming, banking, real estate and oil – 
and became multi-millionaires. They were anxious that the incoming civilian government 
would protect their ill-gotten wealth and sundry privileges.  
 
Before his death in 1998, the military ruler General Sani Abacha had been under 
considerable local and international pressure to step down and hand over power to Moshood 
Abiola, a Yoruba politician from the south west region of the country and the winner of the 
June 1993 presidential election. The annulment of that election (adjudged to be fair and free 
by the international community) and the military government’s execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa 
(the Niger Delta environmentalist and minority rights activist), prompted aggrieved Yoruba 
politicians to establish the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO). The Commonwealth 
Heads of Government (CHOG) imposed sanctions on Nigeria at their meeting in Auckland in 
November 1995. Nigeria had virtually become a pariah state in the international community. 
NADECO’s goal was to get the military dictator General Sani Abacha to relinquish power to 
Abiola. All through the latter part of the 1990s NADECO politicians waged local and 
international campaigns against the military dictatorship until Abacha and Abiola died in 
mysterious circumstances one after the other in 1998. Their deaths provided the ruling 
armed forces with a window of opportunity to design a short and controlled political transition 
programme (Fayemi 1999). 
 
                                               
2
 I am indebted to Robin Luckham for pointing me in the direction of operationalising the concept of ‘political settlement’ for the 
purpose of this report by breaking it down into three different dimensions: critical junctures, constitutional-legal framework and 
rolling elite bargains. 
3
 Author’s interview, analyst, National Defence College, Abuja,18 February 2013. 
4
 Author’s interview, Nigerian NGO representative, Abuja, 19 February 2013. 
11 
In alliance with the serving military head of state, General Abdulsalaam Abubakar, the retired 
generals were clearly the most powerful force in the transition to civilian government. Since 
governance had been dominated by Northern Muslim generals since 1966, the departing 
generals were anxious to hand over to a civilian president from the southern part of the 
country, particularly the Yoruba, home region of the late Abiola. Two retired generals, 
Ibrahim Babangida, a former head of state, and Theophilus Yakubu Danjuma, former chief of 
army staff, played key roles in drafting Olusegun Obasanjo, a former head of state and fellow 
retired general, into the presidential race on the platform of PDP, which next to the All Nigeria 
Peoples Party (ANPP) and Alliance for Democracy (AD) was among the three new political 
parties registered for the elections. It helped that Obasanjo was a Yoruba Christian. The 
departing generals’ backing of retired General Obasanjo, a Yoruba, to contest and win the 
1999 presidential election was designed to placate NADECO and other Yoruba politicians 
while at the same time ensuring that a safe pair of hands able to protect the interests of the 
armed forces was elected. PDP was financed by the outgoing military rulers who ensured 
that it won the presidential election and also produced the governors in the majority of the 36 
states. Of particular interest to the generals were the lucrative oil blocs in the Niger Delta that 
they had surreptitiously allocated to themselves since the 1980s.5 
The armed forces laid down stiff conditions. They drafted a new constitution maintaining the 
federal system with a powerful centre controlling the bulk of the oil revenues and handed it 
down to the incoming civilian government. The liberalisation of the economy and privatisation 
of government owned enterprises, embarked upon by successive military governments, was 
to go on uninterrupted. The armed forces were to be immune from prosecution for past 
misdeeds. The wealth the generals had amassed while in power would not be confiscated 
(Obi 1999).  
The transnational oil companies (TOCs) 
During this pacted transition, the TOCs operating in Nigeria used their informal but very 
effective channels to ensure that their business interests were protected. They were 
particularly anxious that the 1969 Petroleum Decree (later changed to an Act), which places 
ownership of the Delta oil fields with the federal state, be retained. This way they would avoid 
having to negotiate directly with every community in the region that possesses oil-bearing 
land. While sanctions were not placed on Nigerian oil, the United States and European Union 
nevertheless wanted Nigeria to re-join the Commonwealth and resume its role as a 
responsible international partner, particularly in peacekeeping operations on the African 
continent and other trouble spots in the world. 
Shell, Chevron, Exxon Mobil and a number of other oil majors operating in the Niger Delta 
emerged from the turbulent 1990s with their corporate brand image in tatters. They 
understood that with the advent of civilian government they would no longer be able to enjoy 
the unchecked beneficial treatment and shield Nigeria’s military dictators had readily 
provided them in the face of increasing social mobilisation in the Niger Delta against large-
scale environmental damage caused by the oil industry. Unlike the Abacha dictatorship, 
which in the early 1990s readily deployed troops to the Niger Delta at the request of the oil 
companies to quell protests, the oil majors could not expect a civilian Nigerian government to 
protect their interests as vigorously (Okonta and Douglas 2003). They were, however, able to 
adroitly negotiate a new deal for themselves in the new civilian dispensation by offering 
‘protection’ contracts to organised militant youth groups in return for an informal license to 
operate in the Delta undisturbed. Since the TOCs produce the bulk of Nigeria’s crude oil 
through joint venture operations and production sharing contracts with the state-owned 
                                               
5
 Author’s interview, analyst, National Defence College, Abuja, 18 February 2013. 
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Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) they have emerged in the post-1999 
settlement as a powerful, if silent player in Nigeria’s economic and political life.6 
The 1999 polls 
The democratic transition, which ended with the 1999 elections, had far reaching 
consequences for the Niger Delta. The polls and its aftermath threw up a new generation of 
election-rigging politicians who did not have any real base in the local electorate, but relied 
on the central government and the ruling PDP to enforce their will in the various Niger Delta 
states. Powerful political ‘godfathers’, i.e. retired military officers, politicians and influential 
businessmen who had controlled key posts in the state and the oil industry under military rule 
and amassed enormous wealth, emerged (Sklar et al. 2006). They brokered deals between 
the Obasanjo administration in Abuja and its favoured politicians in the Delta without any 
participation of the region’s people. The godfathers froze politics by determining even before 
the first vote was cast who was to be ‘elected’ as governors and state and national assembly 
members. They were able to use the considerable influence they wielded at the national level 
to influence political outcomes at the local level in the Delta by deploying thugs and other 
instruments of coercion, including youth gangs. Local politicians, increasingly seeing the 
former as patrons, looked to them for financial and logistical support during elections, 
relegating ordinary people and their civic concerns to the margins. Mounting levels of voter 
apathy have been recorded in the region as a consequence.7 
According to an international observer, the 1999 polls were a ‘hurried affair’.8  They were 
held in an atmosphere of uncertainty and anxiety. The generals had annulled the results of a 
similar election six years earlier, and no one knew whether they would do the same again. 
Consequently, prominent human rights activists, community leaders and respected 
politicians who otherwise would have put themselves forward for elected office chose to stay 
out, leaving the field wide open for opportunists and corrupt politicians. Powerful grassroots 
social movements, such as the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), 
became less prominent as cynical and self-serving politicians took over control of the 
government of Rivers state and other states in the region. The elections were marred by 
widespread violence and election rigging, particularly in the Niger Delta. Observers from the 
Carter Centre stated that ‘it is not possible for us to make an accurate judgement about the 
outcome of the presidential election’ (Kew 1999). 
Cracking down on Niger Delta social and ‘resource control’ mobilisation 
Even as General Abubakar and the armed forces were preparing to hand over power to an 
elected government they were also battling youth from Ijaw, the largest ethnic group in the 
oil-rich Niger Delta.  Under the auspices of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) in December 1998 
they issued a declaration (Kaiama Declaration) asking the oil companies to quit their oil fields 
in Ijaw territory until Nigeria’s political structure was renegotiated to make for proper 
federalism and also ensure that the Ijaw got a fair share of the oil revenue (IYC 1999). The 
federal military government deployed the armed forces to Ijaw land where they killed scores 
of youth activists. ‘The region witnessed a period of state-sponsored terrorism as the 
crackdown on supporters of “resource control” intensified [...]. The approach adopted by the 
federal government [...] radicalised the Niger Delta youth to become more vocal and 
proactive in participating in the politics of resource control and local resistance. The Kaiama 
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 The lion share of Nigeria’s oil is produced by transnational oil companies through joint ventures with the NNPC, which does not 
operate any assets. Most of the joint ventures operate in the on-shore sector. More recently, Nigeria has introduced Production 
Sharing Contracts (PSC), which do not require Nigerian government investments and entail a higher risk for the transnational 
operators but also higher potential rewards. PSCs are predominantly used in off-shore oil production. Author’s interview, NNPC 
official, Abuja, 22 February 2013.  
7
 Author’s interview, Nigerian NGO specialised in electoral processes and election observation, Abuja, 19 February 2013. 
8
 Author’s interview, INGO representative, Abuja, 22 February 2013. 
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Declaration and the activities of the IYC quickly caught on, with hitherto passive 
organisations and communities becoming belligerent’ (Ako 2011 cited in Obi and Rustad 
2011:45). 
Cementing the status quo: the 2003 and 2007 election cycles    
The 2003 and 2007 elections of the president, members of the National Assembly and state 
governors and assemblies were marred by widespread violence and election rigging, 
particularly in the Niger Delta. In 2003, any remaining hopes for democratic political change 
that had survived after the 1999 polls were dashed by the ruling PDP’s determination to stay 
in power by whatever means.9 Mostly in the run-up to the polls but also on Election Day 
some 100 people were killed nationwide, as rival armed gangs loyal to the various political 
parties fought pitched battles. While the majority of the violence was caused by PDP 
politicians, the other political parties also had their own paid thugs. In the Niger Delta the 
ruling PDP mobilised and funded armed youth militias who terrorised the populace and 
snatched ballot boxes. This was particularly widespread in Rivers state (Human Rights 
Watch 2003). 
The 2007 elections were held against the background of fiery rhetoric and abuse exchanged 
by politicians of the various political parties. Outgoing President Obasanjo had declared that 
the election was going to be a ‘do or die’ affair and, as in 2003, that he was determined to 
ensure that the ruling PDP retained power (Aham 2006). Nothing was done to correct the 
lapses observed in previous elections, and the Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC) was seen by most citizens as a pliant tool of Obasanjo and the PDP. The election, 
which brought Umaru Yar’Adua, a Muslim northerner, to power, was marked by violence and 
election rigging on a very large scale. Observers from the European Union described the 
elections as among the worst they had witnessed anywhere in the world (Dube 2007). 
Corrupt politicians, backed by godfathers openly mobilised gangs of thugs to terrorise 
citizens and political opponents and to stuff or steal ballot boxes. The police were often 
present, but they turned a blind eye to all these abuses. Human Rights Watch estimated that 
at least 300 people were killed in violence linked to the 2007 elections (Human Rights Watch 
2007). 
In sum, the 2003 and 2007 polls strengthened the hold on power of political elites associated 
with the ruling PDP in Abuja, the capital, on their counterparts in the states of the Niger 
Delta. State and local elites relied on their political godfathers in the capital to nominate them 
to lucrative offices and also to ensure that they received their share of the oil rent – disbursed 
monthly to the 36 states of the federation from the capital. National, state and local-level PDP 
politicians became all-powerful and unaccountable, ignoring the complaints of the citizenry 
that such pressing issues as jobs, health care, quality education and physical infrastructure 
had not been addressed.  
The 2011 elections: a small crack in the post-1999 settlement? 
The 2011 polls were an improvement on the elections in 2003 and 2007.10 This was because 
civil society organisations had played a key role in ensuring that Yar’Adua’s vice-president , 
Goodluck Jonathan of the PDP, was sworn in as president when Yar’Adua died in 2010 after 
only three years in office. A cabal in the presidency, composed mainly of Yar’Adua’s loyalists 
had wanted a northerner to succeed Yar’Adua and thus ensure that northern Muslims 
occupied the presidency for eight years like Obasanjo, a Christian southerner, had done. A 
grateful Jonathan promised to clean up the INEC and ensure that the coming 2011 elections 
were fair and transparent. He appointed Attahiru Jega, a respected academic and human 
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 Author’s interview, INGO representative, Abuja, 22 February 2013. 
10
 Author’s interview, Nigerian NGO representative, Abuja, 19 February 2013. 
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rights activist to head the INEC. Jega created a new voters’ register, improved transparency 
in reporting results and publicly pledged to hold accountable those who broke the rules. 
Elections were held in most parts of the country in a largely peaceful atmosphere. There 
were few reported incidents of violence. Even so, thugs were reported to have hijacked ballot 
boxes, particularly in south east Nigeria and in the Niger Delta. 
The 2011 polls saw two opposition parties, the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and 
Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) making some inroads. ACN won the governorship 
elections in five of the six states in the south western part of the country, while Muhammadu 
Buhari, the CPC presidential candidate, was able to give PDP’s Jonathan a credible fight. 
However, to this day the PDP remains the dominant party in the states and the National 
Assembly, and all presidents since 1999 have been members of the PDP.  
Military crack-down in the Niger Delta and the 2009 amnesty  
A first attempt to restore security and law and order in the Niger Delta by military force was in 
January 1994. Following complaints by Shell and other oil majors that they had lost large 
amounts of revenue due to the activities of Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Lt. Col. Dauda Komo, military administrator of the Niger 
Delta state of Rivers, established the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force (RSISTF). In 
a bid to force the MOSOP to allow Shell, which they had expelled in January 1993, to return 
to the Ogoni oil fields, the RSISTF, headed by Major Paul Okuntimo proceeded to attack, 
arrest and kill members of MOSOP and also rape women in Ogoniland. RSISTF and Major 
Okuntimo were to play a role in the chain of events that culminated in the hanging of Ken 
Saro-Wiwa and eight other MOSOP leaders in November 1995. 
The 2003 Joint Task Force (JTF) was modelled closely on the 1994 RSISTF. The JTF is a 
combined navy, army, air and police force with a mandate to secure oil installations, curb oil 
community agitation and neutralise any threat to the oil industry. It was created by President 
Obasanjo three years after he deployed the armed forces to raze the Niger Delta village of 
Odi, killing an estimated several hundred of its inhabitants.11 The decision to create and 
deploy the taskforce was taken by President Obasanjo and his advisers following the rise in 
kidnappings of oil workers by armed youth gangs. Some of these gangs were also involved 
in the hacking of pipelines and oil theft (locally known as ‘bunkering’), and it was felt that a 
show of military force would deter them. The JTF quickly morphed into an army of occupation 
in the Niger Delta, harassing local people and detaining them in military installations at the 
slightest provocation. It was this blatant abuse of power, along with the detention in prison of 
Bayelsa state Governor Diepreye Alamieyeseigha and Asari Dokubo, leader of the Niger 
Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF),12 in 2005, which paved the way for the emergence 
of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in early 2006.  
MEND announced its emergence in January 2006 by bombing strategic oil installations, 
harassing oil workers and generally making the Niger Delta a hostile environment for the oil 
companies to operate in. In the beginning, MEND was able to alter the balance of power to 
its advantage by engaging the JTF in shootouts and putting considerable pressure on JTF 
units.13 JTF commanders responded with fierce, often indiscriminate military action. 
Ultimately, none of the warring parties gained a clear upper hand in this face-off; and JTF 
was not able to prevent MEND from bombing oil installations and disrupting the flow of crude 
to the oil terminals (Ukiwo 2007). It was not until President Umaru Yar’Adua declared an all 
out war on MEND and other militant groups in the Niger Delta in 2009 that the JTF started 
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 The village was attacked by the federal military on the basis of the allegations that it harboured militants who had killed 
several policemen. 
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 The NDPVF was an armed militant group established by Dokubo to fight for a greater share of the oil revenue for the people 
of the region.  
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 Author’s interview, analyst, National Defence College, Abuja, 18 February 2013. 
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bombing camps and villages used by the militants, compelling them to accept the 
presidential amnesty and the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
programme.14 
Three months after he assumed office in May 2007 President Yar’adua instituted the Niger 
Delta Technical Committee (NDTC) to chart a ‘road map’ to peace in the Niger Delta. The 
18-member NDCT was composed largely of youth and community leaders drawn from the 
Ijaw, the largest ethnic group in the region. Initially, the committee conceived the amnesty 
and the DDR programme for the Delta militants as part of a broader four-year strategy with 
the overarching objective of developing the region. The underlying assumption of this plan 
was that development in the Delta could only happen if peace and security was restored and 
the oil industry could resume its normal operations.15  
Yet following the hijacking of equipment belonging to the international oil company Chevron  
in June 2009, President Yar’Adua ordered the JTF to root out MEND and the other militias 
from their camps in the Delta creeks. Several villages in the western Niger Delta were 
bombarded by helicopter gunships leading to severe loss of lives. On 25 June, the president 
unilaterally declared an amnesty for the militants on the condition that they would disarm and 
partake in a demobilisation and reintegration programme designed by the federal 
government (Adigun 2009). While the bulk of the militant leaders accepted this olive branch, 
the more comprehensive and longer term development components of the federal 
governments Niger Delta strategy were shelved.16   
Ordinary members of the militant groups, estimated to number 20,000, were taken to camps 
where they were paid a monthly subsidy and received vocational training.17 Their leaders 
were compensated with lucrative contracts in the oil industry, worth millions of dollars. The 
underlying problems in the Niger Delta – incessant oil spills leading to pollution of farmlands 
and rivers, large scale unemployment, lack of social and physical infrastructure including 
schools, hospitals and roads, corrupt and unaccountable politicians, and a refusal of the 
federal government to increase the oil revenue allocation accruable to the Delta states 
beyond the 13 per cent stipulated by the 1999 Constitution – remained unresolved.  
While the amnesty and the DDR programme have restored relative peace to the region, 
enabling the oil companies to increase production to pre-2006 crisis levels (though not to the 
level of Nigeria’s full production potential), a large number of youth and many of the former 
mid-ranking commanders of the militant groups are yet to be reintegrated into political and 
social life. Unemployment remains rife. Oil theft and the illegal refining of stolen crude, 
organised by these youth in collaboration with powerful regional and national elites, is 
rampant and increasing.18 
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 There is some preliminary evidence that ending the spiralling violence through an amnesty was first proposed by militant 
leaders themselves. Faced with a heavy government military onslaught and sustaining significant casualties and disruption of 
their criminal businesses – foremost the theft of oil and the refining of stolen oil – the militants signalled to Abuja that they would 
be prepared to lay down their arms in exchange for judicial impunity and significant reintegration funds and government 
contracts for the protection of the oil infrastructure in the Delta. Author’s interviews, analyst, National Defence College; advisor 
to the president, Abuja, 18 and 21 February 2013. For more detail on the 2009 amnesty and the DDR programme see section 
4.2 below. 
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 Contribution by a former member of the NDTC in the policy validation workshop organised by the author in Abuja, 20 
February 2013. 
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 The original objectives of the Niger Delta Development Master Plan were far reaching, including economic growth, 
infrastructural development, and addressing regional communities’ specific needs and environmental preservation. The 
elaboration of the plan took more than four years and millions of dollars were wasted on the exercise which did not produce any 
tangible outcomes. Contribution by a former member of the Niger Delta Technical Committee in the policy validation workshop 
organised by the author in Abuja, 20 February 2013.  
17
 There is much speculation in Nigeria about the actual numbers of Niger Delta militants. During the policy research validation 
in Abuja, several sources indicated that militant numbers were bloated by the commanders to gain access to larger reintegration 
funds. The federal government appears not to have conducted a pre-demobilisation assessment of the number of militants, 
which could have been as low as 5,000. Author’s interviews, analyst, National Defence College; INGO representatives, Abuja, 
18, 19 and 22 February 2013.    
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 See section 3.3 below. 
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2.1.2 Constitutional-legal framework 
 
The 1999 constitution and a number of laws enshrine the federal state’s rights and 
obligations vis-a-vis the oil-bearing states in the Niger Delta and determine the appropriation 
and distribution of oil revenues. Overall, this constitutional-legal framework has resulted in 
strengthening the central government’s position and disadvantaging the oil-bearing states, 
though the 1999 constitution introduced a significantly higher oil revenue ‘derivation’ 
percentage (see below). The constitutional-legal framework that has underpinned the 
exploitation of Nigeria’s oil wealth and the country’s political settlement since the transition to 
civilian-electoral rule essentially dates back to the beginning of the country’s independent 
history and a succession of military governments that dominated politics and governance in 
the period 1960–1999. The cornerstones of this framework are the Petroleum Act of 1969; 
the Indigenization of Foreign Enterprises Decree of 1972, the laws establishing the Nigerian 
National Oil Corporation (NNOC) in 1971 and, in 1977, the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC); the Land Use Act of 1978 and the 1999 constitution, which incorporates 
the Land Use Act. In 2012, President Jonathan introduced the Petroleum Industry Bill to the 
National Assembly where it is awaiting passage.      
Since 1960, when Nigeria gained independence and the first commercial quantities of oil had 
just been discovered, the rentier interests of the federal state have underpinned the making 
of oil-related legislation (Garuba 2010). Given the fact that most of Nigeria’s oil is produced 
by TOCs with whom the state operates joint ventures, the corporate interests of the oil 
majors are coincidentally served, protected and promoted by the state’s rent-seeking 
devices. The local oil-bearing communities more often than not have been systematically 
sidelined and their views and interests have hardly been considered in the making of oil-
related legislation (Garuba 2010; Okonta 2008). At Independence in 1960, the revenue 
allocation formula allowed the federating regions to retain 50 per cent of all revenue they 
generated. Following the creation of states on the eve of the Biafra secessionist war (1967–
1970)19 and subsequent military rule, the states’ share of revenue was reduced to 20 per 
cent. During the regime of General Muhammadu Buhari (1983–1985) the revenue share of 
the oil producing states of the Niger Delta was reduced to 1.5 per cent. General Ibrahim 
Babangida’s government that overthrew Buhari in a palace coup in 1985 increased this to 
three per cent in 1992. The 1999 constitution that ushered in civilian rule further increased 
the oil states’ share of oil revenue to 13 per cent. In spite of the boost to their treasury since 
1999, social expenditure in the oil producing states has not been significantly increased. 
Instead, governors and other public officials have been accused of embezzling these funds. 
Towards the end of the Biafra war, the federal government promulgated the Nigerian 
Petroleum Decree No. 51 (1969), which vested the entire ownership and control of all 
petroleum in Nigeria with the state and/or its agency. The Petroleum Decree of 1969 and its 
correlate, the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation of 1969, was a fairly 
comprehensive law with provisions for protecting the environment from damage caused by 
petroleum extraction. The ownership and control of oil and gas within any land in Nigeria as 
well as under its territorial waters or continental shelf was vested entirely to the federal 
government which was legally empowered to compulsorily acquire land for oil companies 
under the ‘power of eminent domain’ as long as compensation was paid to the land owners. 
In 1971, as part of the drive to step up its participation in the oil economy, the federal 
government established the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC), which, in 1977, was 
restructured and renamed the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). In 1971, 
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 In 1967, the Igbo dominated Eastern Region, following the killing of Igbo and other easterners resident in the North in a 
pogrom, decided to secede from the federation. The federal government under northern leadership rejected this move and 
declared war on the East. After a bloody civil war lasting 30 months the Eastern Region was forced back into Nigeria. An 
estimated one million people lost their lives in the war, most to famine and disease. 
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Nigeria also joined the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). OPEC had, 
in its Resolution No. XVI.90, called for member countries to acquire 51 per cent of foreign 
equity interests and to participate more actively in all aspects of oil operations (Allen and 
Okeke-Uzodike 2010). 
In 1972, the federal government introduced the Indigenization of Foreign Enterprises Decree 
on the basis of which it forced all foreign oil companies to start operating joint ventures with 
NNOC. In 1977, government equity participation was increased to 51 per cent. Beyond 
equity participation the NNPC plays a significant role in the downstream sector, discovering 
and allocating of oil and gas fields to producing companies, and in the local marketing of 
refined oil products and export of Nigeria’s oil. It is significant to note that the Indigenisation 
Decree also included ‘personnel indigenisation’. The decree required that, in line with the 
new equity structure, TOCs developed and implemented a time plan for recruitment, training 
and use of local manpower to replace expatriates. Against the backdrop of their substantially 
reduced equity holdings, the oil majors had no difficulties with personnel indigenisation 
because of its inherent advantages, not least the cheapness of local manpower relative to 
expatriates (Turner 1978; Omeje 2006).  
In a number of ways, the indigenisation policy helped to foster the neo-patrimonial interests 
of the dominant federal elites within the oil industry. Among other things, it was apparently 
exploited by sections of the largest ethnic groups – the Yoruba, Igbo and Hausa  – to 
dominate the personnel structure in the oil industry. However, the dominance of the ethnic 
majorities in the Nigerian oil industry remains a controversial subject as many scholars argue 
that the phenomenon is more apparent than real, not least because strategic decisions and 
high value technical aspects of the oil industry remain firmly controlled by the TOC 
headquarters in Europe and the US, often superseding and sidelining the interests of 
Nigerian ethnic majorities and minorities alike (Omeje 2006). Similarly, the indigenisation 
policy has encouraged the issue of oil exploration and production licences to a considerable 
number of members of the Nigerian elites, including retired military officers and well-
connected businessmen; albeit most licensees act as fronts for, or operate as associates of, 
small-scale foreign investors (Omeje 2006). Given their ethnic minority status in Nigeria, the 
oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta have been largely excluded from these rentier 
benefits (Omeje 2006). 
Under the Land Use Act of 1978, ownership rights of all land and its mineral resources came 
to belong to the federal government. The federal state is legally empowered to expropriate 
land from local communities and private citizens for oil, industrial and large-scale agricultural 
purposes (Allen and Okeke-Uzodike 2010). This resulted in the alienation of oil-rich 
communities from their ancestral lands. The law on land ownership obviously runs counter to 
the interest of the indigenous communities in oil-producing areas that depend on 
environmental resources and the land for their livelihoods. The Ogoni people articulated this 
interest in a Bill of Rights, accusing the government and oil companies in different fora of 
stealing their wealth and destroying the environment (Allen and Okeke-Uzodike 2010; Saros 
1990). Both the 1969 Petroleum Decree and the 1978 Land Use Act have been transferred 
to the 1999 constitution. This has regularly triggered protests in the Niger Delta where local 
leaders reject the 1999 constitution as a document effectively reducing their people to 
‘colonial’ status. 
2.1.3 Covert alliances and rolling elite bargains 
 
Heightened political uncertainty due to the transition to civilian-electoral rule resulted in 
tougher competition over the appropriation of oil rents between a growing number of players 
– regardless of the fact that military and conservative elites had sought to keep the lid on the 
post-1999 political process. This had serious negative effects in the oil-bearing Niger Delta 
states and spurred the emergence of rolling, often covert alliances and bargains between 
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state and non-state, and legal and illegal/criminal actors in the Delta, and between them and 
some federal political elites. Ordinary citizens were excluded from these informal, behind-the-
scenes processes. 
Powerful militant and criminal groups emerged in the Niger Delta, taking the previously 
mostly peaceful struggle for ‘resource control’ to another, violent level.20 Under a ‘political’ 
cover they targeted the operations of the oil companies and kidnapped the personnel of oil 
majors. But many of them also engaged deeply in organised criminal activities, setting up 
protection and kidnapping rackets as well as large-scale ‘bunkering’ and illegal crude refining 
rings. While the oil majors further fanned the violence by employing youth groups to act as 
private security guards of the oil infrastructure, so did the federal government by deploying 
the JTF to the Delta. By 2007, the region had turned into a battleground where the brutally 
operating federal security forces were hard-pressed, and ultimately unsuccessful, to put 
down what came to be known as the Niger Delta ‘petro-insurgency’ (Obari 2007).   
The crisis in the Delta had a significant impact on the post-1999 political settlement. The 
previous strategic alliance between the central government in Abuja and the TOCs came 
under stress as new actors with the capacity to influence the political process and severely 
disrupt crude production appeared on the scene, claiming a seat at the table of the oil 
‘poker’. In effect, it became more difficult for federal and national elites, including the 
godfathers, to protect their vested interests in the oil industry as well as the interests of the oil 
majors. They were compelled to negotiate and bargain with a growing number of powerful 
militant, youth and criminal groups in the Delta (Joab-Peterside et al. 2011:87).21 What is 
more, there is some preliminary evidence that political elites at the federal and Niger Delta 
state level expanded their participation in, and benefit from, large-scale bunkering (Joab-
Peterside no date: 21).22  
The 2009 amnesty for the leaders of the most notorious militant groups in the Delta, many of 
whom had connections to bunkering and other organised criminal activities, reflects the 
strategy of Nigeria’s federal elites and the oil companies to regain control of the situation by 
‘paying off’ militant leaders and co-opting them into the post-1999 political settlement through 
the DDR programme and multi-million dollar contracts in the oil industry. While the amnesty 
resulted in a drop in violence in the Delta, it did not address the conflict’s root causes. 
Socioeconomic grievances, such as rampant youth unemployment, persist, and the level of 
criminal activity has increased (Berema 2011). 
Following the amnesty, reintegrated militant leaders have transformed into new, quiet power 
brokers who the PDP governors went to for support during the 2011 elections. In return for 
their help they have received lucrative government contracts and in some cases direct cash 
payments. A number of these militants have established a pressure group called Oporoza 
House which negotiates directly with the federal government for contract work, including 
surveillance and protection of the oil pipelines in the Delta (Ebiri 2012). Some of them have 
also continued to be involved in criminal alliances with members of the local, state and 
federal political elites. In effect, most of the militant leaders still command considerable 
respect and influence in the Delta creeks. The government of President Jonathan, an Ijaw 
from the Niger Delta himself, recognises this and has quietly moved to buy the loyalty and 
support of these leaders.   
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 It is noteworthy that in several towns and villages in the Niger Delta youth leaders began to displace elderly traditional kings 
and chiefs in dealings with the oil companies in matters of compensation where there is an oil spill. This ‘revolution’ has 
occurred with considerable violence. Recognising this reality, the oil companies sometimes engage these youth leaders to 
protect their installations in return for cash payments.  
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 Author’s interviews, INGO representatives, Abuja, 18 and 21 February 2013. According to one account, 500,000 people 
depend on the illegal oil economy in four of the main oil-bearing states, Rivers, Delta, Bayelsa and Ondo (Southernfield 
Development Partners/latitude Development Solutions 2012).  
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A symbiotic relationship has developed between state elites at federal and regional levels 
and community and former militant leaders, particularly since Jonathan took office. The 
president has relied on non-state elites, especially community leaders in the Niger Delta and 
the demobilised militant commanders, to maintain the peace in the region and ensure that 
the oil companies continue extracting oil undisturbed. It is an informal relationship, held in 
place by the fact that the president is Ijaw. The widely held view in the Niger Delta is that he 
deserves to be supported in office because Muslim northerners, who are still hostile to the 
president, accuse him of usurping a position that should have been held by a fellow 
northerner.23  
This relationship is, however, vertical, radiating from the presidency to the Delta 
communities. The latter do not have any levers to hold Jonathan to account and deliver much 
needed public goods and services to the Delta communities. An example of this vertical 
relationship is the federal government’s award of multi-million dollar contracts to protect oil 
pipelines in the Niger Delta to former militant leaders, completely by-passing the ordinary 
people. State governors in the region also replicate this by maintaining a cosy, if informal, 
relationship with these militant leaders, ensuring that their financial needs are taken care of. 
Between them, the PDP-led federal government in Abuja and state governors in the Delta 
have ensured that the horizontal relationships in a healthy and functioning democracy that 
promotes transparency and accountability in the conduct of public affairs are displaced in 
favour of patrimonial networks that benefit only the powerful and favoured in the Niger Delta 
region (Ebiri 2012). 
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 Contributions by Niger Delta NGO and academic participants in the policy validation workshop organised by the author in 
Abuja, 20 February 2013.   
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3 Accounts of violence in the Niger Delta 
Violence in the Niger Delta escalated during the first decade of civilian-electoral rule despite 
attempts by successive governments to resolve it through a mixture of military and 
development interventions as well as political concessions.24 The escalation was not steady 
and gradual, but peaked and troughed. It also built on a history of mostly state-driven 
violence in the Niger Delta in the 1990s. The tactics and strategies of the state and non-state 
actors involved in the violence, including the oil majors, and their motivations have 
undergone significant change since 1999. It is therefore important to recognise that violence 
in the Niger Delta has been of a fluid and dynamic kind, involving changing constellations of 
actors and interests over time.25 
Tying in with the greed and grievance theories of intra-state armed conflict, the literature on 
the Delta broadly falls within one of three camps: those that suggest the violence is driven by 
grievances  –  the injustice that the people of the Delta have historically suffered at the hands 
of the federal government, the military and the foreign oil companies  (Ukiwo 2007; Adekunle 
2009; Ebienfa 2011); greed  – the political economy argument that sees violence in the Delta 
as purely opportunistic, driven by personal desire for political and economic gain (Omeje 
2006); or a more holistic combination of the two (Watts 2008; Watts et al. 2004; Ukiwo 
2007:589).  
According to Uwafiokun Idemudia (2009), neither greed nor grievance can completely 
explain the violence in the Delta because the conflict has passed through several stages in 
which there have been various motivations, pressures and influences, such as the role of oil, 
which have transformed the conflict. While the conflict may have emerged as an expression 
of grievances, and does to some extent maintain that as an ideology, there have been stages 
where other motivations, including those which are based on short-term economic benefits, 
became paramount (Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Idemudia 2009; Nwajiaku-Dahou 2012; 
Watts et al. 2004; Zartman 2005). Using William Zartman’s theory of phases of intra-state 
armed conflicts (Zartman 2005), and the various motivations such as need (grievances from 
political repression and economic deprivation), creed (feelings of selective discrimination and 
deprivation based on beliefs and identity) and greed (private or factional ambitions of private 
gains), Idemudia breaks the conflict in the Delta down into the following phases (Zartman 
2005).   
Need (1960s–1980s), or the root of the conflict which focuses on the structural deficiencies in 
Nigeria that prompted the mobilisation for protest; creed (1990s), or grassroots mobilisation 
around grievances based on the notion of ‘poverty in plenty’; and greed (2000–present), as 
reflected in the rise of organised criminal activities. Within those three phases, other 
researchers have identified various trends. These include the spike in violence around the 
2003 and 2007 elections; the emergence of powerful armed militant groups such as the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in the mid-2000s and the push 
for full resource control rather than simply an increase in the transfers of oil revenues from 
the federal government to the Delta; the peak in acts of sabotage, oil bunkering and 
kidnapping in the years leading up to the 2009 presidential amnesty and DDR programme, 
which appear to have dampened some of the violence (International Crisis Group 2007; 
Hazen and Horner 2007). Resources provided by TOCs to Niger Delta communities, 
including local development funds and ‘payments’ to young men to act as security 
contractors guarding oil pipelines and other infrastructure, also prompted struggles among 
those communities to secure rents (Omeje 2006).  
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Although this study focuses on violence since the 1999 transition to civilian-electoral rule, it 
does recognise that events which transpired before that time influenced the way in which the 
conflict progressed. Importantly, the hanging of Ken Saro Wiwa along with eight other 
MOSOP leaders by the government in 1995, economic decline, the social impact of structural 
adjustment programmes and the government’s heavy-handed response to protests in the 
Delta led to a hardening of attitudes even ahead of the 1999 vote (Hazen and Horner 2007; 
Arowosegbe 2009). Obi defines the violence in the Delta as both ‘an expression of frustration 
as the failure of peaceful protest to lead to any meaningful change in the plight of the people, 
and anger at the impunity with which the region is being plundered by the state oil alliance, 
with the complicity of some local elites and violent youth’ (Obi 2008). Similarly, Kimiedi I. 
Ebienfa refers to the grievances of the Delta populations ‘legitimate’ and describes the 
resistance movement as a ‘refuge for those who have been alienated by the federal 
government/corporate alliance over oil and seek to expose their exploitative agenda’ 
(Ebienfa 2011). 
3.1 Emergence of armed militancy 
 
Up until the 1990s, claims by Niger Delta groups for a greater share of oil revenues, 
socioeconomic development and reparation for serious environmental damage caused by 
the oil majors were largely non-violent. In 1998, ahead of the country’s return to civilian-
electoral rule, military dictator Sani Abacha invited youth to the capital to participate in a 
conference. It gave the Ijaw youth of the Delta their first glimpse of a city that had been built 
on the riches of their communities. Not long after the conference, the Ijaw released the 
Kaiama declaration, which declared all land and oil to belong to the oil-producing 
communities and gave the oil majors until the end of the year to leave the region. It also led 
to the birth of the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), which declared its mandate as seeking resource 
control through non-violent struggle. The federal government responded by declaring a state 
of emergency and flooding the region with troops to protect oil installations. According to 
Ebienfa this was the watershed, when the struggle turned from Saro-Wiwa’s non-violent 
resistance to armed rebellion (Ebienfa 2011). 
While the 1999 constitution included a provision to increase the transfer of oil revenues from 
the federal government back to the oil producing communities from three per cent to 13 per 
cent, this failed to make a difference in development as it only enriched regional elites 
(Adekunle 2009; Ebienfa 2011; Obi 2008). For example, Rivers state received US$100 
million per month for the first eight months of 2006 due to high oil prices (Hazen and Horner 
2007). Yet in terms of socioeconomic development and the wellbeing of communities there 
has been no tangible and visible progress. Much of the Delta remains underdeveloped with 
poor roads, little infrastructure and the country’s highest rate of youth unemployment and 
perception of poverty (Omotola 2007). Many traditional livelihoods, such as fishing and 
farming, have been destroyed due to constant oil spills and pollution (Agbu 2005; Ovwasa 
1999 cited in Omotola 2007).26  
As will be discussed in detail below, the state has, at times, offered concessions to the Delta 
such as establishing the Nigeria Delta Development Commission (NDDC) in 2000 and 
offering amnesties to Niger Delta militants. But its primary response has been one of 
repression, hardening attitudes in the Delta towards violent action as the only recourse to the 
state’s intransigence (Ukiwo 2011). In 1999, just six months after he was sworn in as 
president, Obasanjo ordered the razing of the village of Odi, which was allegedly harbouring 
militants who had killed several policemen (Courson 2009). The hardening of attitudes meant 
that by 2002–2003 there were several militant groups, many linked to secret societies and 
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gangs, which shifted the resistant tactics from non-violent protests to occupations, sabotage 
and vandalism of oil facilities, assault on military targets, and the tactical use of kidnapping, 
including for ransom (Watts 2008).27 In the process, these militant groups started to occupy 
the political space in the Delta that previously had been used by social organisations and 
movements engaged in the non-violent struggle for ‘resource control’ and halting 
environmental degradation caused by the operations of the oil majors.     
Two key players in the early stage of the militancy were Ateke Tom and Alhaji Mujahid 
Dokubo-Asari. Tom was leader of the Icelanders, which in 2003 changed its name to the 
Niger Delta Vigilante Movement (NDVM). Asari was initially head of the IYC, and his 
influence with the largest minority in the Delta meant he was much sought after by politicians 
looking to win regional elections. In 1999 and 2003, Rivers state Governor Peter Odili 
employed both Asari and Tom to ensure a win for the ruling PDP. He supplied them with 
weapons and financial support. But after the 2003 election, Asari fell out with Odili and this 
pitted his Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF) against Tom’s NDVM leading to 
armed clashes between the two sides during 2003 and 2004. At the peak of the violence 
between the two militant groups in early 2004, most of it taking place in Port Harcourt, 
dozens were killed and thousands displaced from their homes.  
President Obasanjo intervened and offered an amnesty to the members of both groups. But 
the DDR programme broke down when the combatants found that there were no jobs or 
training and that they could buy more sophisticated weapons with the money they were paid 
for handing over their old ones. The arrest of Asari in 2005 led to a greater splintering of 
armed groups. Many of the members of the initial two groups joined other groups, such as 
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Martyrs’ Brigade, Outlaws, 
Niger Delta Strike Force, the Coalition for Militant Action (COMA), and the Joint 
Revolutionary Council (JRC).28 While Asari and Tom were no longer as influential as before, 
they still commanded respect among the armed militants. Compounding the insecurity was 
the role of the oil majors, which started to pay local youth and militant groups to protect their 
facilities (Nwajiaku-Dahou 2012).  
Another turning point for militancy was the 2005 National Constitutional Reform Conference, 
during which Delta delegates’ demands to increase the oil dividend for oil producing 
communities from 13 to 25 per cent and a further 25 per cent by 2010, were rejected, fuelling 
further frustration (Obi 2008). The conference was inaugurated by President Obasanjo 
following strident calls from the southern part of the country, particularly from the Niger Delta 
and the Yoruba south west, for the political restructuring of Nigeria to make for a proper and 
functioning federation. All six geopolitical regions sent representatives. At the conference 
Delta leaders demanded that the 13 per cent derivation be doubled, but this demand was 
blocked by northern delegates. Niger Delta leaders walked out, leading to the failure of the 
conference.  
The conference failed because each zone came with a set of demands it did not intend to 
negotiate. The spirit of give and take, so vital for the success of constitutional talks of this 
nature, was lacking and the conference collapsed because the participants could not arrive 
at a consensus on important matters. The far northern parts of the country comprising the 
north west and north east zones were reluctant to participate in the conference in the first 
place and could be said to be the main beneficiaries of its failure. For these two zones, a 
situation where the conference would reduce the amount of oil derived revenue allocated to 
them and increasing the share of the Niger Delta region was an anathema.  
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It is significant that MEND emerged a few months after the unsuccessful conference (Obari 
2005). MEND, an umbrella of various militant groups, pledged to intensify the fight for 
resource control, though it is debated whether this was more rhetoric than genuine political 
motivation (Asuni 2009). This ushered in a new era of violence as MEND escalated the level 
of violence in the struggle, targeting oil installations and oil workers in an attempt to cripple 
the Nigerian economy. Many MEND commanders were heavily involved in illegal oil 
bunkering, although they appeared to distance themselves from kidnappings of oil workers 
for profit, rather than for media limelight (Obi 2008:15; Courson 2009:641; Francis et al. 
2011).  
Violence reached a peak in 2009, when the group Government Ekpemupolo alias Tom Polo, 
a MEND commander in Delta state, seized two oil tankers and took fifteen Nigerians and four 
Filipinos hostage. At the time, Polo had a large following loosely affiliated with the Federated 
Niger Delta Ijaw Communities, a community based organisation which brokered ‘security’ 
contracts with the oil firms and local politicians. The JTF raided Polo’s camp and freed some 
of the hostages. MEND threatened all-out war, but the JTF military pushed ahead with its 
assault. In the end the militants accepted Yar’Adua’s amnesty programme. According to 
Victor Egwemi, this amnesty was Yar’Adua’s last ditch solution to resolving the crisis in the 
Delta, as both institutional-developmental and military interventions had failed (Egwemi 
2010). 
Militancy also spilled over into Cameroon, following the transfer of the Bakassi peninsula 
from Nigeria to Cameroon on the basis of a 2002 ruling by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). Between November 2007 and January 2009, at least eight attacks were reported in 
Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, some by criminal gangs and others by organisations such 
as the Niger Delta Defence and Security Council (NDDSC), which opposes the transfer of 
the territory and demands Bakassi be granted sovereignty or some form of self-
governance.29 The International Crisis Group suggests the militants fighting Cameroon for 
self autonomy gained some support from militants and criminal elements in the Delta, 
although MEND has denied any involvement (International Crisis Group 2009). 
Among the contributing factors to violence and insecurity in the Niger Delta is a thriving 
secondary arms market (Francis et al. 2011). Small arms and light weapons of growing 
sophistication started appearing in 1998–99, when many arms may have been brought into 
the country by Nigerian peacekeeping forces after their assignments with ECOMOG23 in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. In 2003 and 2004, as militants became financially independent of 
political patrons through oil bunkering, tankers that transported oil would also bring in illegal 
and more powerful weapons, such as AK-47s, pump-action shot guns, rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers and others (Davis 2009). Estimates of the number of weapons in Nigeria 
vary from between one million to three million. Most are illegal because of strict laws on gun 
ownership (Hazen and Horner 2007).  
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Weapons have become increasingly sophisticated and powerful over the past decade. A 
survey estimates that the availability of AK-47s in the Niger Delta has increased five-fold 
since 2005, and that ‘militant groups likely possess remote-detonation and night-vision 
equipment, as well as antiaircraft missiles’. It also reports that ‘the five best trained groups 
have a combined fighting force of 10,000 men and access to 25,000 weapons’. Individuals 
and groups are importing and purchasing small arms as a result of the failure of the security 
forces to provide security and, in some cases, due to the draw of rich profits from the use of 
small arms in illegal activities (Hazen and Horner 2007). In other cases, they are given 
weapons by politicians, by members of the military who are sympathetic to their cause or 
through attacks on security forces in the Delta (Hazen and Horner 2007:37). 
3.2 Violence linked to elections 
  
In the aftermath of the 1999 transition to civilian-electoral rule ‘the opening up of political 
space for the expression of pent-up grievances [...] brought a further spate of conflicts’ and 
electoral politics turned into violent zero sum contests between patronage based political 
parties (Ibeanu and Luckham 2006; Ebo 2006 cited in Hazen and Horner 2007).  ‘Everyone, 
including [the UK’s Department for International Development], underestimated the challenge 
Nigeria confronted in 1999. [...]  There was an assumption that the transition from military to 
civilian rule would create the necessary political space, and political will, for significant pro-
poor reform’ (DFID 2004 cited in Hazen and Horner 2007). But instead, the elections only 
deepened divisions, and increased the level of violence, as politicians armed unemployed 
youth, criminal gangs and other groups joined in a bid to gain political control, and therefore 
access to oil revenues (Hazen and Horner 2007).  
Many in the Delta saw how public office holders were able to use oil revenues for their own 
private enrichment which led to greater jockeying for power in 2003 and more election-
related violence. In both elections, politicians in the Niger Delta and other states paid youths 
to attack their political opponents and intimidate voters to have them support a particular 
party. While not exclusively, the ruling PDP was especially responsible for these practices 
(Human Rights Watch 2003:25 cited in Francis et al. 2011). Before and during the 2003 
elections, hundreds of people were killed throughout Nigeria, many of them in the Niger 
Delta. Bands of political thugs fought for physical control of localities. In Nembe (Bassambri), 
a town in Bayelsa state, clashes allegedly resulted in at least a dozen fatalities. At least ten 
people were killed in a clash between PDP and All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) supporters 
in Oporoma, headquarters of Bayelsa’s Southern Ijaw local government (International Crisis 
Group 2006). 
After the polls, politicians tended to abandon the youth who they had supplied with weapons 
and cash. With no jobs but with access to weapons, many set up their own guns-for-hire 
groups, and carried out attacks on oil companies and kidnapping of oil workers for profit. 
Militancy thrived in the region because guns meant more than votes during elections 
(Ebienfa 2011:637; Courson 2009). The weapons held by those in the 2003 election were 
still in their possession in 2007, but with the groups more powerful than before. In the interim, 
many had also resorted to other forms of criminality (Hazen and Horner 2007). As violence 
was entrenched in the Delta it became a ‘hard currency’ that was used by all actors to press 
their demands and achieve their own political and economic goals.30 
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3.3 The militants and organised crime 
 
The jockeying for power and control of oil rents, the arming of youth and their lack of 
alternative livelihoods resulted in the emergence of a new layer of militancy in the Delta 
(Ebienfa 2011:637).  Powerful groups at the federal and regional government levels, 
including politicians, retired military officers and ‘godfathers’, allied with local youth and 
militant organisations to take advantage of the chaotic situation to illegally appropriate oil 
revenues through bunkering and illegal oil refining.31 Organised crime increasingly 
penetrated Nigeria’s political system; political ends and criminal means became dangerously 
entwined (Francis et al. 2011:2). As Nuhu Ribadu, Nigeria’s former anti-corruption chief, put 
it, the state is ‘not even corruption. It is organised crime’ (The Economist 2007 cited in 
Courson 2009). At the same time, the claims by genuine ‘resource agitators’ who sought to 
achieve more control of the oil wealth for the benefit of the Niger Delta populations were 
hijacked by criminals seeking only profit, so that ‘every form of outsider came through the 
gates: cult leaders, political thugs, criminals, and self-centred individuals hiding under the 
cloak of resource agitators’ (Courson 2009:639-640). ‘They became preoccupied with 
benefiting themselves and their parochial interests and the focus of the struggle for the 
control of resources and self-determination became lost. It led to an ungodly mix of 
criminality and militancy, and included armed hostage taking’ (Ebienfa 2011:240). 
This spike in criminality occurred between 2005 and 2009, following the emergence of MEND 
and its strategy of direct action against the oil industry. In that period, attacks on oil 
installations and oil theft caused a daily loss of production of up to 65 per cent, though the 
average loss was about 25 per cent (Francis et al. 2011). The sabotage of oil pipelines in the 
Delta was initially related to dangerous, small-scale oil theft by groups who sold the crude for 
artisanal refining on the local market and also sought to pressure the oil majors into providing 
community development and compensation for environmental damages. Later it morphed 
into a lucrative large scale business involving Niger Delta militant groups, both to fund their 
insurgency but also purely for profit. There is mounting, though still preliminary, evidence that 
armed forces personnel and political elites at the local, regional and federal levels of 
government are involved in ‘bunkering’; and a World Bank report flags the issue of ‘informal 
excess lifting of crude oil at export terminals’ allegedly carried out by international oil 
companies (Gboyega et al. 2011:18–20).      
According to data provided by the NNPC, total oil production in the Niger Delta was at 2.03 
million barrels per day in 2002; after which it steadily rose to a peak of 2.52 million barrels 
per day in 2005. In 2008 it then dropped to a low of 2.11 million barrels per day and finally 
increased again to 2.45 million barrels per day in 2010. Production then fell slightly to 2.37 
million barrels per day in 2011.32 The accuracy of these figures is difficult to verify as there 
are diverging views among oil sector experts as to the capacity of the Nigerian states for the 
physical measurement of the stocks and flows of oil.33 This notwithstanding, the official 
figures reflect the trend in a decline in oil production due to the crisis in the Niger Delta in the 
period 2005–2009 that has been observed by independent analysts. According to the above-
mentioned World Bank research report, it is estimated that Nigeria lost US$8 billion in oil 
revenue in 2005, US$16 billion in 2006, US$19 billion in 2007 and US$34 billion in 2008 due 
to foregone production (‘shut-ins’) and theft. The report estimates that in 2003 300,000 
barrels were stolen each day and 320,000 barrels were not produced (shut-in). The 
estimated figures for the following years are 300,000/210,000 (2004); 250,000/160,000 
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(2005); 100,000/600,000 (2006); 100,000/600,000 (2007); and 140,000/660,000 (2008) 
(Gboyega et al. 2011:19). The trend in oil theft reflected in these figures roughly matches the 
estimates provided by Legaloil.com, a project of the Nigerian CLEEN foundation (Davis 
2008).   
Kidnappings in the Delta have been occurring in the past ten to fifteen years, if not longer. 
Yet the full extent of this unlawful activity remains in the dark. The available figures are 
incomplete and they only include reported abductions (International Crisis Group 2009). 
There can be no doubt, however, that this is a very serious problem in the Niger Delta. 
Hostages are taken for two principal reasons: exerting political pressure on foreign oil 
companies and the Nigerian government, and seeking criminal economic gain. Militant and 
youth groups in the Delta have used kidnapping of foreign oil workers to raise the profile of 
their cause; kidnap ransoms have been used to fund arms purchases. However, kidnapping 
proved so lucrative that some groups started resorting to kidnapping purely for economic 
gain.  
Abductions of oil workers, mainly expatriates, increased in the period 2005–2009 (Francis et 
al. 2011: 59; Davis 2009).34 There was a spike in kidnappings in 2006, prompting President 
Obasanjo to warn that force would be met with force. In August 2006, MEND declared an 
end to kidnappings, but a few months later abductions spiked again. Some observers have 
put the number of kidnappings at 300 people between January 2006 and February 2007 
(Hazen and Horner 2007); while others have claimed that between 60 and 150 hostages 
were taken. The number of kidnappings increased significantly in early 2007, with almost 
daily hostage taking after the elections. Militants also changed tactics, kidnapping children 
and the elderly relatives of politicians, something which MEND distanced itself from (Hazen 
and Horner 2007). There is some preliminary evidence that following the 2009 presidential 
amnesty the rate of kidnapping in the Delta first dropped but then went up again as the 
reintegration component of the DDR programme failed to produce results.35  
Pirate activities have also been on the rise in the Delta and the Gulf of Benin. Many of the 
waterways in the region have become the dens of bandits and sea pirates. This is particularly 
so in Bayelsa and Delta states, as well as the River Nun, Forcados River and Tungbo Creek. 
Passenger and trading boats are attacked and occupants are robbed and sometimes killed 
or maimed. There were forty reported incidents of piracy in the Delta in 2008, according to 
the International Maritime Bureau; in the first three weeks of 2009 there were ten reported 
incidents. Among those was the boarding of an oil tanker carrying 4,000 tonnes of diesel by a 
militant group. It was the first such attack at sea (International Crisis Group 2009). 
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4 Policy responses to violence in the Niger 
Delta 
 
Since 1999, the federal government’s responses to the crisis and violence in the Niger Delta 
have oscillated between measures aimed at furthering the region’s development and a tough 
security strategy geared at uprooting armed militants and protecting the oil infrastructure. 
These measures have been combined with presidential amnesty offers to militants and some 
initiatives to reform Nigeria’s oil sector, foremost through the Nigeria Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (NEITI) and the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). Overall the responses 
to the violence have suffered from weak design and feeble implementation. They have also 
lacked coherence and, in the case of the security measures, have had highly adverse 
consequences for the human rights situation in the Niger Delta. While the oil majors have 
contributed to socioeconomic development initiatives, the available evidence suggests that 
their impact has been limited, even negative. In some cases, inappropriately designed 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and direct cash payments to community 
leaders ended up fanning violent conflict between communities and different ethnic groups in 
the Delta (Watts 2008).          
4.1 Developing the Niger Delta versus repressing armed 
militancy 
 
In 2000, the Obasanjo administration established the Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NDDC). The Commission’s mandate is to offer a lasting solution to the socioeconomic 
difficulties of the Niger Delta (Omotola 2007). However, right from the start it suffered from a 
lack of ownership (Newsom 2011).36 It was also speculated that its creation was rushed 
through in response to outrage over the razing of the village of Odi in 1999 (Transnational 
Crisis Project 2010). Obasanjo also commissioned a review of the security approach to the 
Delta, which was conducted in 2002 by the then chief of army staff, Lt. Gen. Alexander 
Ogomudia. The report recommended, among other things, an immediate ‘upward review of 
the minimum 13 per cent derivation to not less than 50 per cent’ and repeal of some laws, 
including the Land Use Act of 1978 and the Petroleum Act of 1969, which it said 
‘dispossess[es] oil producing areas of their land’. Yet the federal government ignored the 
recommendations (Adeyeri 2012; International Crisis Group 2007). In 2005, the government 
initiated the National Constitutional Reform Conference in which the Delta delegates argued 
for a phased increase in the transfer of oil revenues to the oil-bearing states to 50 per cent. 
Their demands were refused. 
 
While the NDDC has implemented a large number of infrastructure projects over the past 
twelve years (some 2,000 by 2010), it has suffered from a lack of local ownership as local 
stakeholders have not been involved in any meaningful way in the design or location of 
projects. Despite the formal existence of oversight mechanisms, corruption and a lack of 
transparency and oversight have also been major problems. Three NDDC directors were 
sacked for corruption and there have been recurrent concerns about fictitious projects and 
contracts being granted to family members or used to prop up patronage networks (Higgins 
2009; Adeyeri 2012; International Crisis Group 2007; Omotola 2007). Citizens in the Delta 
have little trust or respect for the NDDC.37 A spokesman for MEND noted: ‘NDDC is a 
channel for further looting of the meagre sums allocated to developing the Niger Delta. Most 
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of the contracts go [to] outsiders […] The so called representatives in these bodies are 
toothless stooges whose duties are to append signatures to agreements made in their 
absence’ (International Crisis Group 2007).  Federal government funding of the NDDC has 
been inadequate, and foreign oil companies initially balked at paying three per cent of their 
budget into the commission, as did Nigeria’s states (International Crisis Group 2007).38 
Hence, under President Obasanjo the development impact in the Niger Delta of the NDDC 
was negligible.39 The region saw a deterioration of the human development situation and 
violence against the state, oil companies and between ethnic communities increased sharply 
(Omotola 2007).  
When the violence in the Delta intensified due to the elections and inter-community conflicts 
over community development funds and direct cash payments to local leaders from 
transnational oil companies, the federal government deployed the JTF (Courson 2009: 639–
640). It was instructed to adopt a ‘shoot to kill’ policy as the oilfields descended into chaos 
(Watts 2008). The JTF has been accused of exacerbating the violence, due to its brutal 
reaction to non-violent protests against oil spills, overzealous razing of villages allegedly tied 
to militant groups, moonlighting as private security contractors for oil companies and ties with 
militant groups and illegal oil bunkering (International Crisis Group 2006).40 The JTF failed to 
stem the tide of violence because its acts only incensed people in the Delta and hardened 
their attitudes. While the state also sought to frame the violence as terrorism, in an attempt to 
legitimise its brutal repression of protesters in the eyes of the international community 
(Courson 2009: 20–21; Chiluwa 2011), Obasanjo tried twice to reach a settlement with the 
Niger Delta militants. Both in 2005 and 2006 these attempts failed because Obasanjo merely 
sought to get the militants to decommission their weapons without bothering to address their 
fundamental grievances. 
Under President Yar’Adua the NDDC was revitalised. The federal government committed 
US$566 million in 2009, more than double the previous administration’s contributions. In 
2010, the NDDC was expected to receive US$1.6 billion (Higgins 2009; Newsom 2011). 
Corruption and lack of capacity continued to dog the NDDC, but it has increasingly been 
drawn into donor and oil major development strategies, with a focus on capacity building 
(Idemudia 2009).41 This notwithstanding, the people of the Delta still perceive it in a negative 
light. They are far from convinced that the commission is acting on their behalf and feel that 
often the projects are ‘imposed’ on them. In 2008, Yar’Adua responded to the failure of both 
the NDDC and the repression of the militants and youth groups in the region by establishing 
the Niger Delta Technical Committee (NDTC). Drawn from across the nine oil-producing 
states as well as from federal agencies, its members were to look once again into the issues 
of sustainable development in the Delta. Its recommendations included: an increase of 
transfers of oil revenues from the federal government to the oil-producing states to 25 per 
cent; complete initial steps to support a DDR process for militant youths within six months; 
and improve operational integrity of security forces and the police in the Niger Delta to a level 
that would assure communities and businesses that security and safety would be upheld. 
The second part laid out broad themes and roles for stakeholders in a regional 
transformation agenda running through to 2020. The third part recommended the creation of 
institutions and mechanisms to guide the implementation of the measures contained in the 
report. This included the significant establishment of a Niger Delta Special Infrastructural 
Development Fund, a Niger Delta Futures Trust Fund and a Community Trust Fund Scheme 
(International Crisis Group 2009). 
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Although the NDTC submitted a report to government in November 2008, nothing much was 
heard afterwards. Rather, the federal administration switched to setting up a Ministry of Niger 
Delta Affairs. The creation of the ministry drew mostly negative reactions from other parts of 
the federation. In the Delta it was perceived by some as a significant sign of federal 
government commitment to the crisis in the region while others urged caution arguing that it 
might end up becoming an avenue for corrupt enrichment and political patronage rather than 
serving the interests of the people of the region (Francis et al. 2011). 
4.2 The 2009 amnesty and the ‘afterthought’ DDR programme 
  
While the creation of the ministry reflected a fresh attempt to deal more holistically with the 
violence and crisis in the Delta, the federal government authorised a large scale military 
offensive against MEND in April 2009. On 13 May 2009, as the president was developing 
proposals for an amnesty and a DDR programme, the JTF launched a robust attack on the 
headquarters of the prominent MEND leader, Tom Polo. Unconfirmed reports allege that 
significant numbers of non-combatants were killed in this attack (Molloy 2011). Under 
pressure from the international community to end the conflict and thereby ensure the free 
flow of oil, the government then responded with an offer of amnesty.  
The 2009 amnesty has been deemed a success, as within months more than 20,000 
combatants laid down their weapons for jobs and to join a reintegration programme (Francis 
et al. 2011).42 However, critics have warned that unless the roots of the conflict, including the 
grievances of the Niger Delta population, are dealt with, the amnesty and the DDR 
programme will ultimately fail (Francis et al. 2011: 22). The federal government’s approach to 
DDR bears similarities to the practices employed by oil companies and state governments 
during the insurgency: paying militants off so they do not attack oil or state government 
institutions. The Bayelsa ‘cash for peace’ programme was most notable in this regard, with 
camp commanders being paid about US$67,000 per month since 2005. The idea was to take 
the militants out of the security nexus, but instead it has only provided the camp 
commanders and former militant leaders with a more privileged position (Nwajiaku-Dahou 
2012). It is thought that Yar’Adua also encouraged some of the militants to set up private 
companies so they could be given contracts for protecting oil companies and installations. As 
one Nigerian observer put it, the DDR programme has been an ‘afterthought programme’, as 
the principal goal of the federal government was to end the violence to safeguard the 
production of oil and not to reintegrate members of militant groups into civilian life and 
address their socioeconomic grievances.43  
According to a panel set up in January 2010 to review the reintegration aspect of the DDR 
programme, about 80 per cent of the budget had gone on payments to consultants and 
contractors, leaving just 20 per cent for the rehabilitation of ex-militants. It has also been 
observed that vast constituencies of people alienated by petro-business interests, but lacking 
the means of violent action, have been excluded from the post-amnesty deal. This includes, 
to a large extent, the Ogoni people, especially the youth who never participated in the armed 
struggle. The probability remains that these alienated youth can mobilise themselves into 
militant groups to fight the state (Oluwaniyi 2011). 
To date, Nigeria has not created the necessary institutional structures with the capacity to 
develop, produce and implement coherent plans for the reintegration of ex-combatants into 
their communities, or for the development of social or economic capacity in those 
communities expected to receive them. There is no sign of a credible framework of proposals 
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 A total of 26,358 ex-combatants (including nearly 1,000 women) have now joined the post-amnesty programme of 
transformation and reintegration, at a cost of $660 million in 2011.  
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 Contribution by a Nigerian NGO representative in the policy validation workshop organised by the author in Abuja, 20 
February 2013. 
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or a coherent operational plan and there is suspicion that the intention was to achieve short 
term conflict reduction to permit a stabilisation of oil production and reduce international 
pressure in the lead up to the 2011 elections. However, the period in question, mid-2009 to 
mid-2010, did reflect the short term benefit of a significant drop in violence (Molloy 2011). 
This notwithstanding, there appears to have been a renewal in violence, with an increase in 
kidnappings and a threat from MEND to resume their insurgency over the failure of proper 
compensation and amnesty pay-outs (Gbomo 2012). 
4.3 NEITI and the Petroleum Industry Bill 
 
The Nigeria Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) is mandated by law to 
promote transparency and accountability in the management of Nigeria’s oil, gas and mining 
revenues. A major component of the ongoing anti-corruption reform in Nigeria, it is the 
national version of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).44 
NEITI was inaugurated in February 2004 by President Obasanjo when he set up the National 
Stakeholders Working Group (NSWG) under the leadership of Obiageli Ezekwesili. The 
NSWG45 oversees the activities of NEITI and is made up representatives of government, 
extractive companies and civil society. Among others, NEITI commissioned the first 
comprehensive audit46 of Nigeria’s petroleum industry for the period 1999–2004 and is 
working with various stakeholders to build national consensus on the need for extractive 
revenue transparency in Nigeria. There was a second audit for the year 2005 with the same 
scope, which has since been published, and the audits for the years 2006–2008 and 2009–
2011 were contracted out to private consultancies in 2010 and 2012, respectively. 
In December 2004, a bill was introduced to the National Assembly to provide NEITI with a 
legal foundation. The NEITI bill was eventually passed and harmonised by the two chambers 
of the National Assembly and subsequently signed into law by President Obasanjo in May 
2007. With this, Nigeria became the first EITI-implementing country with a statutory backing 
for its operations.47 
After the publication of the audit for the period 1999–2004, the Federal Executive Council48 
agreed on a set of priority actions to remedy some of the major problems that had been 
identified, such as collection of taxes and royalties, fiscal regime, revenue administration, 
lacking up-to-date metering systems (Gboyega et al. 2011: 18-20). The resulting 
Remediation Action Plan was subject to implementation by the Interministerial Task Team 
(IMTT), including representatives of relevant agencies (extractive industry companies, civil 
society, labour unions) as well as extractive industries experts. However, EITI 
implementation in Nigeria has been difficult because of bureaucratic delays, unresolved 
differences between the NEITI secretariat and National Stakeholder Working Group (NSWG) 
and lacking political leadership. Although NEITI was a good fit with the Yar‘Adua–Jonathan 
administration’s (2007–2011) stated objective of strengthening due process and the rule of 
law, as well as fighting corruption and promoting transparency, the government’s support 
was limited.  
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 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was launched on the global stage in September 2002 by UK Prime 
Minister Tony Blair at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. In June 2003, at a 
conference in London, a Statement of Principles to increase transparency of payments and revenues in the extractive sector 
was agreed. These twelve EITI Principles centred on the need for transparent management of natural resources. The EITI 
process is supported financially and practically by a number of bilateral and multilateral donors. The EITI secretariat is located in 
Oslo and hosted by the government of Norway. 
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 http://www.neiti.org.ng/sites/default/files/pdf 
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 http://www.neiti.org.ng/documents/neiti-audit-reports 
47
 http://www.neiti.org.ng/pages/about-neiti 
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 The president and ministers integrate the Federal Executive Council; the president serves as the chairman. The FEC is 
charged with initiating the policies and programmes of the federal government and ensuring that they are properly implemented. 
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In 2012, President Jonathan introduced the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which includes 
among other things, a novel petroleum host community development fund. The bill was first 
discussed in 2007, and has been through many revisions since. It aims to replace all existing 
legislation on oil and gas sector issues and fundamentally revamp the institutional setup of 
Nigeria’s oil sector. Among the most incisive reforms contained in the bill is the breakup of 
the powerful NNPC, changes to the fiscal regime of the oil sector and the introduction of a 
new community fund that ‘shall be utilized for the development of the economic and social 
infrastructure of the communities within the petroleum producing area’. 
The oil industry opposes the bill in its current form because it would create significant 
uncertainty for the industry by, for instance, not specifying in detail the new fiscal regime. The 
PIB has further been criticised because of its focus on infrastructure development and that it 
foresees that oil companies will be obligated to give up another 10 per cent of their monthly 
profits, effectively increasing tax on oil extraction from the current level of 85 per cent to 95 
per cent. It also fails to explicitly recognise communities’ rights to the benefits of the 
resources atop of which they live (Ojameruaye 2012). In light of these critiques, it is yet 
unclear whether the bill goes far enough to satisfy the demands of the population in the Niger 
Delta and what the prospects for its passage in the National Assembly are.  
 
4.4 Transnational oil companies 
 
Working in a cosy alliance with the federal military governments, most foreign oil companies 
operated in the Delta without paying much attention to their responsibilities and obligations 
vis-a-vis local communities. In the early 1990s, when faced with protest and social 
mobilisation due to large scale environmental degradation and abysmal levels of human and 
socioeconomic development in the Delta, they thought they could simply give things to 
communities: schools, clinics, bridges. This would buy them a social licence to operate. Yet 
Delta communities, who were not consulted about their needs, never saw these 
infrastructure projects as belonging to the community and some were deliberately targeted 
by militants and youth groups when violence picked up in the 2000s (Idemudia 2009; 2010; 
Davis 2009). 
At that time, when it became clear that community assistance programmes were having no 
tangible impact on the levels of violence despite the large sums of money that were being 
spent, the oil majors began to move from community assistance to community development 
(Idemudia 2009; 2010). On paper, this shift meant greater community participation in the 
design and implementation of projects funded by the oil companies. In reality, most 
community development programmes have continued to be driven by a ‘business case’ logic 
and have not resulted in a change in the way companies extract oil (Idemudia 2010).49  
While these programmes did lead to some improvements in the living conditions in the Delta, 
this was mostly so because the baseline was very low to start with. But together with large 
direct cash payments to community leaders made by the oil majors to keep the peace their 
biggest impact on the volatile situation in the Delta was ironically a deepening of violence 
brought on by a culture of expectation and inter-ethnic conflict over community development 
resources (Idemudia 2009; 2010). The concept of ‘host communities’ used by oil companies 
to delimit the scope of their social responsibility and their selection of communities to benefit 
from the development and CSR programmes was responsible for the Nembe war in 2005 
and the intercommunity conflict between Emouha and Ogbakiri communities in Rivers state. 
It also contributed to triggering the Warri wars, as the Ijaw and Itekiri ethnic groups moved 
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 The two constant complaints from citizens of the Delta are gas flaring and oil spills. For example, between 2000 and 2004 
roughly 5,400 incidents of oil spills were officially recorded. Gas flaring has damaged the zinc roofing of houses, stunted crop 
yields and made rain water undrinkable, forcing community residents to replace house roofs more often and children travel 
further to fetch drinking water.  
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from fighting over political rents to oil rents (Idemudia 2010). The following sections present 
brief overviews of the community development and CSR activities of the three largest 
transnational oil companies in Nigeria: Shell, Exxon Mobil and Chevron.  
Shell (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, SPDC) 
 
In 1997, SPDC moved away from community assistance to community development. 
Projects were to be determined by a participatory needs assessment, yet Shell still came 
across as the philanthropic benefactor, and its driving force was never development, but 
mitigating conflict. This type of development assistance created high expectations and more 
instability because it prompted conflict and competition between Niger Delta communities for 
development resources (Idemudia 2009). In 2003, SPDC changed again from community 
development to sustainable community development focused more on building partnerships 
with communities through Global Memorandums of Understanding (GMOUs). By this the oil 
company sought to mitigate violence it feared could be on the rise but also to reduce the 
amount of money it was spending. In 2002, SPDC spent US$67 million on community 
development. After the establishment of GMOUs in 2007, this was reduced to US$30.8 
million (Idemudia 2009). 
Some of SPDC’s conflict mitigation activities have been met with criticism. For instance, the 
‘sit at home allowance’ for youth has been critiqued for fuelling violence by putting cash into 
the hands of young unemployed men and rewarding negative rather than positive behaviour 
(Oluwu 2010). The selection of host communities – referred to as ‘operational communities’ – 
has also exacerbated inter-communal conflict over land and water tenure. GMOUs have not 
always helped to address these problems. There have been issues in relation to the Gbarain-
Ubie Integrated Oil and Gas project and the GMOU with Bayelsa state. GMOU communities 
said they were not consulted; and while the construction of the pipeline for the oil and gas 
project went ahead, the accompanying development projects stalled (Draper 2010).   
Exxon Mobil (Mobile Producing Nigeria, MPN) 
 
Corporate philanthropy and social investment were traditionally the main strategies employed 
by MPN to contribute to community development. MPN's efforts in this regard were in the 
areas of health care, education, road construction, electricity and water supply. However, in 
2002, MPN claimed it shifted its focus in community assistance (CA) initiatives from providing 
social infrastructure to local capacity building and economic empowerment (Idemudia 2009). 
The shift in MPN's emphasis in its CA projects can be attributed to three main reasons. 
Firstly, the government now has the resources to build infrastructure through the 
establishment of NDDC to which MPN contributes over US$18 million per year. Secondly, 
MPN does not have the resources or expertise to make development happen by itself; other 
organisations need to be enlisted to help. And thirdly, true Sustainable Community 
Development (SCD) is based on the creation of wealth within communities and not on the 
redistribution of income, assets or gifts. Real economic growth is based on private 
investment and individual initiative (Idemudia 2009). 
MPN's new emphasis on capacity building and economic empowerment invariably made the 
forming of partnership imperative, and partnership the dominant strategy for managing 
issues of corporate-community relations. The Integrated Community Development Project 
(ICDP) is one of MPN's Programme Partnership. ICDP was initiated by the Akwa Ibom State 
Government (AKWSG) in April 2002, which launched the project with an endowment fund of 
US$94,000. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-Human Development 
Fund (HDF) pledged US$125,430 and MPN donated US$313,576 to the project. ICDP is 
based on a support agreement and memorandum of understanding signed by the various 
partners (AKWSG, MPN, UNDP-HDF) which stipulate the roles and responsibilities of each 
partner (Idemudia 2009). MPN provides funds and participates in selecting the beneficiary 
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communities. The Ministry of Economic Development, which is the representative of 
AKWSG, is responsible for project implementation, monitoring and evaluation. In addition, 
the ministry reports back to partners, while the community as a benefactor is consulted to 
ascertain its needs. Communities are also required as part of their contribution to donate 
land for the provision of social infrastructure and set up project management committees to 
ensure project sustainability and community ownership of projects. 
However, given that most of MPN's partnerships are not community driven, as communities 
are often not involved as direct partners but more often as benefactors rather than active 
participants, MPN partnerships are thus largely top-down in nature. Failure to sufficiently 
involve the community in the design, implementation and monitoring of community 
development projects means MPN Community Development Partnership (CDP) initiatives 
often fail to reduce powerlessness and build channels for citizens in the host communities to 
voice their concerns; the impact of CDP initiatives on poverty reduction is therefore undercut 
(Idemudia 2009). Exxon Mobil's policy of building contacts in the communities by meeting 
only with a few chiefs and council leaders effectively limits community participation. 
Chevron (Chevron Nigeria Limited, CNL)  
 
Prior to the crisis in 2003, CNL’s approach was to establish agreements with individual 
communities impacted by its operations, including homage payments to traditional leaders, 
work-for-cash and larger scale infrastructure projects that would benefit the entire 
community. However, funds usually ended up enriching community leaders. The lack of 
transparency over how much each community received fuelled inter-community conflict.  In 
2005, CNL decided to take a new approach. Instead of signing individual contracts with ‘host 
communities’ GMOUs would be established with clusters of communities. Each cluster would 
form a Regional Development Council (RDC) that would represent all communities within the 
cluster. Instead of 400 agreements with individual communities, CNL now has GMOUs with 
eight RDCs covering 425 communities in five states. Where previously the communities were 
considered beneficiaries, now they are seen as partners in socio-economic development. 
Communities are also incentivised through a ‘peace bonus’ of additional community 
development funds if CNL facilities remain free from sabotage and violence (Hoben et al. 
2012). 
The first GMOUs were signed for the period 2005–2008. Following this a review was 
undertaken, the GMOUs were renegotiated and new ones were signed for the period 2009–
2011. A similar process took place in 2011; and most recently GMOUs have been signed for 
the period 2012–2015. The new relationship has resulted in a significant reduction in 
violence and community-sponsored attacks against the company’s operations attributed in 
part to peace bonuses contained in the GMOUs. Stakeholders have reported reduced 
tensions between communities and ethnic groups in some areas, as well as overall 
reductions in violence (Hoben et al. 2012). However, there appears to be a lack of 
coordination between the GMOUS, the NDDC and state-level governments and their 
development commissions.  
In 2010, CNL set up the Niger Delta Partnership Initiative (NDPI) with US$50 million over five 
years as a way to ‘promote and support multi-stakeholder programmes that address the 
needs of communities and foster increased donor assistance for community based 
organisations in the Niger Delta’.50 It works with a variety of organisations, from local CSOs 
to bilateral and multilateral funders and federal institutions, such as the Ministry of Niger 
Delta Affairs. One of its stated goals is to ‘provide conflict analysis, conflict resolution 
training, and peace-oriented social marketing programming both for stand-alone projects and 
as integral parts of other PIND programmes to manage conflicts in vulnerable 
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communities.’51 In 2011, USAID became the first international donor to contribute to the 
NDPI. Other donors include GIZ and the UNDP. 
4.5 International donors 
 
After the transition to civilian-electoral rule, international donors began returning to Nigeria. 
DFID set up a country office in 2001 and the European Commission (EC) resumed its aid 
around the same time. Apart from an EC micro projects programme, very little of the early aid 
was focused on the Delta and its oil-bearing municipalities and communities as donors were 
concerned about poor governance at the level of the state governments.     
The US has emerged as the largest bilateral development assistance donor, with USAID 
allocating approx. US$420 million a year, followed by UK’s DFID (US$300 million), Germany 
(US$33 million) and Japan (US$31 million). The World Bank is the largest multilateral donor 
(US$841 million), followed by the EU (US$74 million) and UN (US$53 million).52 Yet the 
significance of international aid to Nigeria must not be overstated. World Bank data since 
1999 show that official development assistance (ODA) to Nigeria has been below 0.6 per 
cent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP).53 Until recently, many donor agencies 
concentrated their support on ‘lead’ or ‘focus’ states. In the Niger Delta only Cross River 
state has consistently met the governance and accountability criteria to qualify as such a 
‘lead state’. Donor aloofness has contributed to a sense of neglect felt by the Niger Delta 
population, though a plethora of NGOs and civil society groups have been active in the 
region. Many of them are funded by donors or foreign oil companies (Francis et al. 2011: 90–
92). 
In terms of conflict mitigation projects, USAID, DFID and UNDP appear to be the only ones 
with programmes where conflict mitigation is a primary goal. Other projects have more 
broadly economic development, good governance and poverty alleviation as goals. Yet until 
recently donor investment in the Niger Delta in governance and conflict initiatives has overall 
been very low (Newsom 2011). Most donors work through local NGOs and more recently are 
beginning to partner up with oil majors, such as Chevron, to fund community development 
foundations.  There has also been some donor cooperation. For the programme period 
2010–2013 the World Bank Group and DFID joined with USAID and the African 
Development Bank to prepare a joint Country Partnership Strategy for Nigeria. In distinction 
to earlier initiatives, the new partnership does not propose a common set of focus states, but 
rather suggests that ‘need’– in addition to ‘performance’– is a valid criterion for targeting 
assistance. 
Annex 1 provides an overview of the interventions of the main international donors with 
respect to violence mitigation, conflict and risk management, good governance, youth 
unemployment and community development in the Niger Delta. It is noteworthy that in the 
past couple of years donors have become more active in the Niger Delta, focusing their 
efforts on the local level. This may be related to a drop in the levels of violence following the 
2009 presidential amnesty for Niger Delta militants. 
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5 Policy implications: Towards a pro-
development political settlement and 
integrated violence mitigation in the Niger 
Delta 
 
Nigeria’s post-1999 political settlement emerged from a military controlled transition to 
civilian-electoral rule that was geared at protecting the economic, political and judicial 
interests of the outgoing federal military rulers and their civilian allies.  The pact also included 
the transnational oil companies. Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, they had reaped 
great benefit from a close alliance with a succession of military governments and had high 
stakes in maintaining their lucrative business operations in the country after the generals’ 
formal departure from power. 
What in the pre-1999 era had been an openly illegitimate, predatory and exclusionary 
political settlement centred on the appropriation of massive oil rents by a relatively small 
number of federal (military) elites and the oil majors began to morph into a seemingly 
broader one under the new political regime. While competition for elected office at the 
federal, regional and local levels of government increased, this happened mostly within the 
patronage-based PDP and its smaller off-shoots and not between several genuinely 
representative and issue-based political parties.  Furthermore, with the exception of the 2011 
polls, all elections since 1999 were surrounded by violence and rigged, especially those of 
2003 and 2007. Almost fifteen years after the transition, the political opposition to the 
hegemonic PDP remains weak though more recently it has made some electoral inroads, 
particularly in the states of Nigeria’s south west. With the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) still 
languishing in the National Assembly, the governance of Nigeria’s vital oil industry and the 
distribution of oil rents remain essentially unchanged. The exception is a constitutionally 
mandated increase to 13 per cent of the transfer of oil revenues from the Federal Account to 
the oil-bearing Niger Delta states.   
In the wake of the transition, and with their corporate brand image in shatters, the oil majors 
adopted a lower key public stance and evolved their corporate social responsibility activities 
in the Niger Delta states from community assistance to community development. Due to their 
unrivalled economic and technological clout they remain key players in Nigeria’s oil-centred 
post-1999 settlement. At the same time, social mobilisation for resource control and 
environmental protection in the Delta was progressively sidelined and overtaken by a 
plethora of armed militant and criminal groups. These groups have variably served as paid 
thugs for politicians, mostly of the PDP, eager to win seats in the National Assembly and the 
Niger Delta governorships, which are highly coveted due to the increased transfers of oil 
revenues to the Delta states. They have also acted as private protection forces for the 
transnational oil companies; brokers between the oil majors and local community leaders; as 
well as oil thieves and kidnappers, often working hand-in-glove with members of the federal 
security forces and political elites. A number of the commanders of groups such as MEND 
and NDVF managed to amass large fortunes and have effectively been co-opted into 
Nigeria’s post-1999 settlement. The 2009 presidential amnesty played an important role in 
this respect, as have the (covert) bargains between former militants and the Jonathan 
administration and the multi-million dollar contracts they have received from the government 
for the protection of oil infrastructure in the Delta. 
This dynamic and fluid yet essentially conservative and predatory political settlement has 
significantly contributed to, first, spurring violence and large-scale criminal activity in the 
Niger Delta and, since 2009, pacifying the region through the co-option of militant leaders. 
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No foundations were laid for a lasting peace or effectively addressing the grievances of the 
Delta communities and involving them in any meaningful way in the process. As we have 
shown in this report, the nature and evolution of the settlement has not precluded attempts 
by the federal government and the oil majors to tackle the Delta’s development challenges. 
However, these efforts have by and large not borne fruit due to a lack of incentives for, and 
political will on the part of, federal and regional elites to follow through with development 
programmes and governance improvements. All along, it has been easier for them to pay the 
militants off and default back to repressive security policies. Regardless of the serious 
human rights violations associated with largely ineffective military interventions in the Delta, 
the political cost involved in deploying the JTF has been smaller than it would have been had 
the PDP governments in power since 1999 seriously pursued reforming Nigeria’s system of 
appropriating and distributing oil revenues. The oil majors, in turn, have benefited a great 
deal from the alliance with the federal government, and they continue to do so; beyond their 
enhanced community development initiatives they have not shown much interest in deeper 
reforms. This is reflected, for instance, in their opposition to the PIB.  
The big challenges in the Niger Delta remain. By all accounts, the ‘Niger Delta question’, as it 
is often referred to in Nigeria, is not close to resolution. The region has temporarily been 
pacified and crude production has gone up again, though it still falls short of Nigeria’s 
production potential (Newsom 2011). But the reintegration of former mid-ranking militant 
commanders and fighters is faltering and social unrest persists due to high youth 
unemployment and poverty; large-scale, organised criminal activity continues. Violence could 
quickly re-erupt and send the Delta back to where it was before 2009 if no remedying action 
is taken by the Nigerian authorities and their international partners. 
Looking forward, it is crucial to recognise that Nigeria is not a failed state, despite pervasive 
corruption, criminality and mismanagement in the public sector. Yet it is a polity underpinned 
by a political settlement that seriously constrains democratic politics, legitimate and effective 
governance and pro-development reform – in the Niger Delta and also other parts of the 
country. For decades, oil and the appropriation of oil rents by domestic and international 
elites, particularly the oil majors, have shaped this settlement. There have been numerous 
political and social reform initiatives and push-back from pro-democracy, human rights and 
social grassroots organisations and movements in the Delta and elsewhere; even from 
sectors within the federal state and some regional governments.54 But thus far these groups 
have been unable to influence and change elite interests and incentives in any significant 
way. They have been sidelined or victimised by a network of powerful state and non-state 
groups that appear determined to uphold the existing settlement and have shown to be 
patently prepared to use unlawful and violent means to achieve their goals. 
The analysis presented in this report indicates that addressing the Niger Delta question – 
and the political instability, pervasive poverty, environmental degradation, human rights 
violations and political and criminal violence it entails – requires profound changes in the way 
Nigeria’s elites relate to, and interact with, their own country and fellow citizens. Given the 
prominence of oil in the country’s political economy, the aim should be to harness natural 
resource wealth for the benefit of the majority and not the few, whose ranks have recently 
been swelled by former militant commanders who learned that violence pays. In this setting 
governance is of the essence. We define ‘governance’ as processes of exercising public 
authority through the making of collectively binding rules and the effective provision of public 
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 For instance, in 2011 President Jonathan signed an amendment to the Act that set up the Nigerian National Human Rights 
Commission. The Commission is now empowered to institute any civil action on any matter it deems fit and to publish reports on 
the state of human rights promotion and protections. Further, in 2012 Nigeria’s former Executive Chairman of the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission Nuhu Ribadu led the elaboration of a detailed and incisive report by the Petroleum Revenue 
Special Task Force set up by President Jonathan. Although the draft report was leaked and its potentially major impact on the 
oil industry thereby pre-empted, it helped spotlight some of the major problems of corruption and waste in the Nigerian oil 
economy. 
37 
goods and services by state and non-state actors. Reforming and strengthening governance 
at the local, regional and federal levels is paramount to address socioeconomic grievances, 
criminality, corruption and violence in the Niger Delta and beyond.  
Our emphasis on the importance of governance reform questions the conventional 
assumption that it is the exclusionary nature of a political settlement that contributes to 
violence as contending elites, including leaders of social movements and popular sectors, 
take to violent action to press their inclusion in the settlement. According to this view, a more 
inclusive or ‘inclusive enough’ political settlement, as DFID calls it, reduces the risk of elites 
seeking recourse to violence as they are included in political and economic decision-making 
processes (DFID 2010). Yet the case of the Niger Delta shows that ‘inclusivity’ on its own is a 
weak indicator for determining whether a political settlement is violence-prone or not. The 
2009 presidential amnesty and the 2011 election of Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw from the 
Delta, resulted in expanding the existing settlement through the cooptation of ‘new’, 
contending militant elites who had pressed their inclusion by militarily targeting the country’s 
vital oil industry. Beyond contributing to the fragile and temporary pacification of the Delta, 
this process has not prompted any tangible changes in the way the federal and regional 
governments administer and distribute the country’s natural resource wealth and address 
socioeconomic grievances, poverty, criminality and violence in the Delta and other parts of 
the country. 
In this vein, it is important to ask how a political settlement is expanded to include additional 
social groups; who is included and why; and what does the expansion of the settlement 
mean in terms of reducing the risk of violence through improved governance and public 
policies that are capable of addressing socioeconomic grievances and other drivers of 
violence. On the basis of this analysis we suggest a strategy that focuses on the inclusion of 
important democratic, pro-development and non-violent ‘counter-elites’, particularly from the 
Niger Delta, in Nigeria’s post-1999 political settlement. In our view, this requires significant 
and coordinated governance reforms at the local, regional and federal levels. Without such 
reforms it is unlikely that the Delta and the country will be able to overcome violence or the 
risk of it. On the other hand, if tangible results could be achieved in the oil-bearing region in 
the medium term, Nigeria would be well positioned to start addressing also the increasingly 
serious problem of violence in other parts of the country, especially the violence associated 
with Boko Haram in the North.      
Outside leverage for governance reforms in Nigeria is limited. Issues of sovereignty and 
vested interests in the country’s oil industry have led domestic political elites to resist 
international donor assistance on many occasions in the past (Newsom 2011). Further, while 
the oil majors have evolved their engagement with communities in the Delta and are 
nowadays allocating significant amounts to community development, their business rationale 
obviously continues to focus on profit-making and not governance reform and the inclusion of 
hitherto excluded sectors in the country’s decision making processes and political 
settlement.55 Hence, the reform initiative needs to be taken by Nigerians themselves. Outside 
actors can and should support certain political processes but need to make sure that they do 
not complicate matters further. 
Among civil society organisations in the Niger Delta there is a strong view that top-down and 
militarised approaches to development, conflict resolution and violence mitigation in the 
region have been counter-productive or outright failures.56 Strengthening accountability 
mechanisms at the local and regional levels are perceived to be crucial to improve service 
delivery and reduce corruption and the massive patronage economy that underpins the 
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 Contribution by a representative of a transnational oil company at the policy validation workshop organised by the author in 
Abuja, 20 February 2013. 
56
 Contributions by participants in the policy validation workshop organised by the author in Abuja, 20 February 2013. 
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dominance of political elites in and outside of the Delta (Newsom 2011). At the same time, 
there is awareness that without first boosting accountability, elections will continue to prompt 
political violence and slow economic development, particularly if the patronage-based 
political parties are not reformed and if they refrain from strengthening internal democratic 
structures and process like primaries (Newsom 2011).57 Further, judicial impunity is seen as 
major problem; profound reforms of Nigeria’s ailing justice system are required to rein in 
corruption and (state-sponsored) criminality.58 The 2009 amnesty and the DDR programme 
are perceived as federal government measures to placate and co-opt the most powerful 
militant leaders without contributing to building lasting peace and furthering development in 
the Niger Delta. It is especially resented that once those militant leaders received the 
benefits for laying down their arms they dissociated themselves from the non-violent, political 
struggle against corruption and public waste and mismanagement in the regional 
governments.59  
On the basis of this analysis, the following macro areas for policy action to advance violence 
mitigation in the Niger Delta can be identified: 
 Strengthening accountability and mechanisms of redress at the local through to the 
federal levels of government and governance. 
 
 Building the capacity of Niger Delta civil society, community and social organisations 
and movements to participate in decision-making processes related to local and 
regional development and oil production. 
 
 Linking the reintegration of demobilised militants into economic and social life to local 
development efforts in the Niger Delta, with a particular focus on job creation and 
vocational training for youth. 
 
 Democratising Nigeria’s political parties, especially the PDP, to move away from 
patronage-based and godfather politics; and strengthening the electoral process. 
 
 Strengthening Nigeria’s justice system to reduce judicial impunity, corruption, human 
rights violations by state security forces and (state-sponsored) criminality, such as 
massive oil theft and illegal oil lifting. 
These are huge tasks for any country and they clearly are for Nigeria. However, if the country 
and its international partners, including the transnational oil companies, fail to think big and 
adopt a comprehensive and necessarily longer term strategy to address serious governance 
problems that affect the situation in the Niger Delta there is a real risk that the region will see 
the re-emergence of large scale violence.  
On a positive note, if Nigeria were to make progress on the governance front this would not 
only reduce the risk of violence in the Delta flaring up again but also contribute to changing 
the intrinsically violence prone nature of the post-1999 political settlement. This time the 
inclusion of non-violent elites would not come about through the co-optation of powerful 
actors that are using violence and unlawful means to further their own economic and political 
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 Contributions by participants in the policy validation workshop organised by the author in Abuja, 20 February 2013; author’s 
interview with Nigerian NGO representative, Abuja, 19 February 2013. 
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 Contributions by participants in the policy validation workshop organised by the author in Abuja, 20 February 2013. 
59
 Contributions by participants in the policy validation workshop organised by the author in Abuja, 20 February 2013. Arguably, 
the militant leaders had already dissociated themselves from the political and social struggle for ‘resource control’ and 
development in the Delta years before the 2009 amnesty entered into effect. This has been part of the problem of the conflict in 
the Delta: armed and criminal actors from the region have used violence in the pursuit of their own, particular economic and 
political goals and by doing so have occupied the political space that previously was used by non-violent social organisations 
and movements, such as MOSOP. This has severely limited the chances for a peaceful and lasting solution of the conflict in the 
Niger Delta. 
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goals, but through the strengthened democratic process and progressively more accountable 
and legitimate governance.  
The international donor community should help Nigeria build a pro-development political 
settlement. It can do this by offering its good offices as a facilitator and supporter of   political 
and policy dialogue between Nigerians, increasing development assistance in the identified 
policy areas, and reducing the negative fall-out of the oil majors’ interests and operations in 
the country. 
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Annex I: Main international donor programmes 
for governance strengthening and violence 
mitigation in the Niger Delta  
Table 1 
Donor Organisation Programmes 
DFID 
Strengthening 
Transparency and 
Accountability in the Niger 
Delta (STAND project) 
Developing Good 
Governance in Niger 
Delta, 2008–2013 
Nigeria Stability and 
Reconciliation Fund 
In the Niger Delta, DFID 
has pursued several 
strands of activity: the 
STAND project, which 
works through NGOs to 
build the capacity of 
communities to hold local 
governments 
accountable; Developing 
Good Governance in the 
Niger Delta and various 
small projects including 
support to the National 
Orientation Agency for 
youth training and work 
with ActionAid to establish 
a conflict early-warning 
system in the Delta 
region. More recently, 
DFID is channelling funds 
through the Stability and 
Reconciliation programme 
for Nigeria. 
The project is seeking 
to build the capacity of 
six Local Government 
Areas (LGAs) in 
Bayelsa, Rivers and 
Delta states to deliver 
needs-driven services 
and to support civil 
society to hold LGAs 
to account. Lead 
implementing partner 
is Living Earth Nigeria 
Foundation, which 
works with two other 
organisations, 
Academic Associate 
PeaceWorks (AAPW) 
and Institute of 
Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law. A 
mid-term review of the 
project found it had 
enhanced 
communication 
between local 
government and 
communities, with a 
more participatory 
development 
approach. CSOs were 
more empowered to 
challenge the 
effectiveness of LGAs 
through a good 
governance forum 
and ‘accountability 
corps’.  The good 
governance forum is a 
The five-year 
programme, which 
began in 2012, is a 
partnership with the 
British Council in 
Nigeria, International 
Alert and Social 
Development Direct. 
It aims to help 
manage conflict non-
violently in several 
states across Nigeria, 
including three in the 
Delta (Rivers, 
Bayelsa, Delta).
60
  
There are 4 main 
outputs:  
1. Broader social 
participation in, and 
oversight of, conflict 
management 
mechanisms at 
federal, state and 
local levels. 
2. Reduction of 
grievances in target 
areas around 
economic 
opportunities and 
distribution of 
resources. 
3. Increased and 
more influential 
                                               
60
 It is worth noting that Bayelsa, Rivers and Delta states have been donors’ ‘lead states’ in the Niger Delta as they have more 
effective governance structures than the other states in the region.  
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town hall meeting 
between LGAs and 
CSOs to discuss 
rights, roles and 
obligations. The 
Accountability Corps 
are youth of both 
sexes who follow up 
on project delivery. 
The review found that 
CSOs were now able 
to monitor the use of 
development funds 
and that there was an 
improved openness 
and trust between 
LGAs and CSOs, 
engendering peace 
and harmony (Bedford 
and Oluwasuji 2011). 
participation of 
women and girls in 
institutions and 
initiatives relevant to 
peacebuilding, with 
reduction of violence 
against women.  
4. Key decision-
makers and opinion 
formers engaged with 
the project have 
influence on stability 
and reconciliation.  
No review of the 
programme is as yet 
available. 
Table 2 
Donor 
Organisation 
Programme 
USAID 
Conflict Abatement through Local Mitigation (CALM) 
Focuses on five focal states in Nigeria; Rivers, Delta, Plateau, Kaduna, Kano. 
CALM was an experiment for USAID in Nigeria as it had not carried out such 
direct conflict mitigation and management programmes before and was in the 
early stages of revamping its conflict mitigation programmes. The Nigeria 
programme began in 2007.  
Some notable achievements included the setting up of peace clubs in every 
secondary school in Plateau state and the expansion of peace clubs from 
senior to junior secondary in parts of Rivers state and the replication of youth 
groups across the targeted states.  A mid-term review found the youth groups 
in Rivers state to be a promising innovation that could help to bring about a 
sustainable peace culture in the state. The youth groups mediated disputes; 
and an early warning system set up by club’s members prevented the school 
from being attacked my militant youth.  Members of the club see themselves 
as change agents and have gone back into their communities to act as 
ambassadors of peaceful resolution of conflict. It also resulted in the setting up 
of the Wakirika United Peace Group which worked with elders to demobilise 
militant youths. This led to the Ogoni, Wakirika and Andoni Youth Association 
– youth from communities previously at odds with each other. Some of the 
members of the group are former militants who are now peace ambassadors 
(LaPin et al. 2009).  
In April 2010, the US and Nigeria formally inaugurated a Bi-National 
Commission that provides a framework for mutual diplomatic and development 
efforts under four working groups. The Niger Delta and Regional Security 
Cooperation working group expects to support plans to provide tangible 
development and economic opportunity to the people of the region as well as 
augment partnership on regional security. The first meeting of the Niger Delta 
working group took place in September 2010 (Francis et al. 2011). 
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Table 3: 
Donor Organisation Programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European 
Commission 
In 2010, the EC approved €478m grant for Nigeria, including €200m for 
an EU-Niger Delta support programme with the overall objective of 
mitigating conflict by ‘addressing the main causes of unrest and violence 
– bad governance, youth unemployment and poor delivery of basic 
services’.
61
 
Examples for key activities include:  
 Employment for youth in road maintenance and refuse 
collection. 
 Grants to technical and vocational colleges. 
 Support, including training, for improving public management 
systems. 
 Various support measures for improving access to safe, 
adequate and sustainable water, sanitation and hygiene. 
The remainder of the grant will go towards federal, state and local 
governance reform, anti-corruption, justice sector support, fighting drugs 
and organised crime, water supply and sanitation sector reform.
62
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 ‘European Union Helps Nigeria to Consolidate Peace in the Niger Delta and Ensure Better Governance and Improved Service 
Delivery’, Press Statement European Commission, 2 December 2012. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/piebalgs/headlines/news/2012/02/20120203_en.htm 
62
 Ibid. 
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Table 4 
Donor Organisation Programme 
UNDP 
The (2009–2012) country programme for Nigeria has four parts, 
including a sustainability and risk management programme (SRMP), 
which includes ‘conflict prevention, management and peace building’. 
SRMP is about protection and development of the people and natural 
resources, with a focus on the environment, gender and the Niger Delta 
(Bedford and Oluwasuji 2011). 
The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is 
responsible for implementing the UNDP Youth Empowerment Program 
(YEP) for job training and development in Warri in Delta State. The 
three-year programme which started in 2008 is funded by Shell and 
based on the idea that skills training and employment for youth are 
viable solutions to militancy. YEP is appropriately positioned to pave the 
way towards the reintegration of ex-combatants as well as to develop 
skills in non-militant youth. YEP also provides an opportunity to support 
the Nigerian government’s ongoing demobilisation, disarmament, 
reorientation, and reintegration (DDRR) programmes under the current 
Amnesty (Francis et al. 2011). There are no official reviews of this 
project.  
UNDP has also pledged US$25 million to the Integrated Development 
Community Programme, set up in 2002 as a partnership between the 
Akwa Ibom state government and Exxon Mobil. Exxon Mobil contributes 
US$50 million to the project, which is mostly a micro-credit scheme to 
boost small-scale entrepreneurs in 14 communities in Akwa Ibom state. 
Communities participate by donating land to projects like a communal 
rice farming plant. Projects include a farm school, technical training and 
economic empowerment. It also provides some infrastructure 
development such as tap water (Idemudia 2009).  
Idemudia (2010) found that the Exxon Mobil projects had minimal impact 
on development in Akwa Ibom, mostly because the years of neglect 
meant community demands far outweighed what was being supplied.  
Also, investment has been uneven and was not driven by needs but by 
corporate logic. Much of the projects took place in areas where Mobil 
had a head office or where a member of staff lived. The company used 
the partnership as a ‘business tool’ rather than a development tool. It 
has failed to reach the poorest of the poor or to empower them by giving 
them any voice in design or location of projects, and company 
executives would only meet with the elite when discussing needs, 
reaffirming existing power structures. There has also been no change in 
Exxon Mobil’s business operations, with gas flaring and oil spills 
happening with impunity. Exxon Mobil has even appealed the US$10 
million it has been ordered to pay three southern communities as 
compensation for oil spills (Idemudia 2010). 
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Annex 2: Map of Nigeria showing 36 states 
 
Source: Mapsof.net 63 
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 Reproduced under Creative Commons from http://mapsof.net/map/nigeria-states-map 
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Annex 3: Map of the Niger Delta States 
 
Source: Robinson Tombari Sibe (with permission) 64 
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 Map produced by Robinson Tombari Sibe for his article published by GIS Development 
http://www.gisdevelopment.net/application/health/overview/Challenges-of-Mapping-Applications-in-Health-and-Academic-
Research-in-the-underdeveloped-World.htm (GIS Development is now Geospatial World www.geospatialworld.net) 
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